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INTRODUCTION 
It is a puzzling case where the plaintiff, after losing at an evidentiary hearing that 
was tantamount to a full trial on the merits, elects to voluntarily dismiss its complaint, yet 
the defendant insists upon fighting on, and on, first in the district court and now on 
appeal. 
What is more baffling: this is a game that truly has not been worth the cost of the 
candle. Despite Defendant-Appellant Chris Hogan's extended argument in a 46-page 
Appellate Brief, all that is really at stake in this appeal is $6,744 in attorney fees. 
UTOPIA filed suit to interpret and enforce the confidentiality provision in a 
contract drafted and signed by Hogan. The action was filed only in the face of threats by 
Hogan to bring a lawsuit that, in his own words, would invite "public scrutiny" and 
thereby "threaten[] to destroy the work of UTOPIA." 
UTOPIA succeeded in obtaining a TRO against Hogan. Moreover, to avoid 
mooting the very issue in dispute - confidentiality - UTOPIA also provisionally obtained 
an Order Sealing Records. At the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction the 
following week, however, UTOPIA lost. After careful evaluation of the district court's 
oral ruling and UTOPIA'S prospects going forward, UTOPIA withdrew its motion to seal 
the records and voluntarily dismissed its action the morning following the hearing. In 
simple terms, UTOPIA accepted its loss on the merits and concluded to move on. 
By his own account, Hogan expended attorney fees of $6,744 in his successful 
opposition to UTOPIA'S preliminary injunction motion. 
7 
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UTOPIA concedes that, under current Utah law, a defendant who prevails against 
a preliminary injunction motion has at least a colorable claim to recover the attorney fees 
spent in that effort - to the extent (and only to the extent) that those fees are not 
duplicative of fees that would have been incurred in a litigation upon the merits. 
UTOPIA argued below that no fees should be awarded because the fees expended 
by Hogan would ultimately have been incurred in the course of the litigation to address 
the merits. The district court ruled in UTOPIA'S favor and denied any attorney fees. 
Reasonable minds could differ on the merits of that determination, and UTOPIA 
acknowledges it is a credible issue for this Court's review. 
But Hogan further seeks to challenge the district court's factual determination that 
the lawsuit was not brought in bad faith, and that UTOPIA committed no contempt of the 
Order Sealing Records. These matters do not merit serious discussion. Sadly, Hogan has 
spent far more than his $8,000 pursuing these contentions, in the process needlessly 
imposing on this Court, the district court, and UTOPIA. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction by transfer of this appeal from the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(j). The Utah Supreme Court had original 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-3-102(3)(j). 
8 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the District Court acted correctly in denying Hogan's request 
for attorney fees incurred in opposing UTOPIA'S preliminary injunction motion. 
Standard of Review: The denial of a request for attorney fees under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 65A is reviewed for correctness. Ikon Office Solutions v. Crook, 2000 
UTApp217,t7, 6P.3dll43. 
2. Whether the District Court's finding that UTOPIA'S action was not 
brought in bad faith is clearly erroneous. 
Standard of Review: "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." UTAH R. CIV. P. 52(a). To 
establish that a finding of fact is erroneous, the appellant 
must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
weight of the evidence. If the evidence is inadequately 
marshaled, this court assumes that all findings are adequately 
supported by the evidence. 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 19, 100 P.3d 1177 (citation omitted). "Even where the 
[appellants] purport to challenge only the legal ruling . . . , if a determination of the 
correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the 
[appellants] also have a duty to marshal." Id. at % 20; See also United Park City Mines 
Co. v. Stitching Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, f 24, 140 P.3d 1200 ("To pass 
this threshold, parties protesting findings of fact must marshal all the evidence in support 
of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
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finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." (quotation 
omitted)). 
3, Whether Hogan has standing to challenge the district court's refusal to 
hold UTOPIA in contempt for any alleged violation of the Order Sealing Records. 
Standard of Review: This issue was not raised before the district court. Standing, 
however, is a jurisdictional issue that may be raised at any time, even for the first time on 
appeal. Sonntag v. Ward, 2011 UT App 122, «| 2, 253 P„3d 1120. 
4. Whether the district court correctly determined UTOPIA committed 
no contempt of the Order Sealing Records, where that order was issued upon 
UTOPIA'S motion and for UTOPIA'S benefit, where UTOPIA withdrew the motion 
with no objection from Hogan prior to any release of records, and where the district 
court ultimately held that the records should not be sealed, and no party has 
challenged that determination on appeal. 
Standard of Review: The decision not to hold a party in contempt of a court order 
will not be reversed "unless the trial court's action 'is so unreasonable as to be classified 
as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of discretion.'" Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT 
App 14, H 8, 973 P.2d 988 (quoting Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 240 
(Utah 1976)). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) (in part): 
10 
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Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of witnesses. 
Utah Code § 78B-5-825(l) (in part): 
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees 
to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or 
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
UTOPIA brought suit to interpret and enforce a contractual confidentiality 
provision in a contract prepared by Hogan, in response to Hogan's threat to disclose 
information that, according to Hogan, would subject UTOPIA to damaging publicity. (R. 
24-27; R. 480 at 108:8-9.) UTOPIA obtained a TRO, restraining Hogan from "disclosing 
confidential information of UTOPIA obtained in the course of his consulting services 
with UTOPIA." (R. 97A.) Consistent with the confidentiality sought in the underlying 
action, UTOPIA also obtained an Order Sealing Records, although the district court 
expressly held the issue open for further review. (R. 94-96.) 
The following week, after a full evidentiary hearing, the district court denied 
UTOPIA'S motion for a preliminary injunction and dissolved the TRO. (R. 480.) The 
next day, UTOPIA withdrew its motion to seal records and voluntarily dismissed its 
lawsuit. (R. 123-24.) 
11 
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Hogan subsequently moved for his attorney fees, citing two grounds: first, under 
Rule 65A, as the prevailing non-moving party in UTOPIA'S preliminary injunction 
motion; and, second, under Utah Code § 78B-5-825 because allegedly UTOPIA'S lawsuit 
was without merit and not brought in good faith. (R. 129.) 
Hogan also asked the district court to hold UTOPIA in contempt for allegedly 
violating the Order Sealing Records, by releasing records in UTOPIA'S possession after 
UTOPIA had withdrawn its motion to seal. As a sanction, Hogan sought an award of his 
attorney fees. (R. 223.) 
The district court denied both of Hogan's motions after a full hearing. (R. 466 A-
B, 482.) Hogan appealed that order. (R. 472.)l 
1
 After filing his notice of appeal, Hogan attempted to conduct additional 
proceedings in the district court. These are expressly referenced in Hogan's Statement of 
the Case and require a response. See Appellant's Brief at 4. 
Some five months after giving notice of this appeal, and while Hogan had the 
record checked out from the district court, Hogan obtained Judge Fratto's signature on an 
Order Denying Plaintiffs Request for a Preliminary Injunction. This came three days 
before Judge Fratto's retirement and without prior notice to, or opportunity to object by, 
UTOPIA. Hogan has now submitted in the Addendum to his brief the Order bearing 
Judge Fratto's signature. 
UTOPIA objects to any consideration of this Order and requests that it be stricken: 
(1) it is not part of the Record on appeal; (2) execution of the Order was obtained in 
violation of Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f), requiring Hogan to first serve the proposed Order upon 
UTOPIA and allow UTOPIA five days to file objections; (3) entry of an order after 
UTOPIA'S voluntary dismissal exceeded the district court's jurisdiction, see Thiele v. 
Anderson, 1999 UT App 56, \ 26, 975 P.2d 481; and (4) the District Court had no 
jurisdiction to enter such an order while the appeal is pending. See Kennedy v. New Era 
Indus., 600 P.2d 534, 536 n.3 (Utah 1979). 
Contending that the same Order somehow reopened the matter in the district court, 
Hogan also filed a "Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment" - actually a motion for the new 
district judge to reconsider Judge Fratto's rulings upon the issues Hogan has appealed to 
this Court. By way of update to this Court, at a March 21, 2012, hearing, Judge Faust, 
12 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
UTOPIA and Hogan entered into a twenty-four month contract for Hogan to work 
for UTOPIA as an independent contractor, commencing May 12, 2009. (R. 32-43 
(Agreement for Professional Services).) The contract was prepared by Hogan, (R. 480 at 
108:8-9.), and it included a confidentiality provision, whereby Hogan agreed that he 
"understands that the Services performed for UTOPIA are confidential and . . . agrees to 
maintain such confidentiality." (R. 33.) 
In early 2011, the relationship between Hogan and UTOPIA soured, and on March 
21, 2011, Hogan's counsel delivered a draft complaint to UTOPIA. (R. 45-57.) The 
draft complaint was followed, three days later, with a demand letter from Hogan, seeking 
$219,000. (R. 65, 63-69). The demand letter asserted that filing of the draft complaint 
would invite "public scrutiny" and that "public scrutiny . . . threatens to destroy the work 
of UTOPIA." (R. 64.) 
UTOPIA filed this action on Monday, April 18, 2011, seeking a TRO and 
preliminary injunction to interpret and enforce the confidentiality provision in its contract 
with Hogan. (R. 1-3, 23-30.) UTOPIA also moved to seal the file pending resolution of 
the Motion for Preliminary Injunction to prevent the mooting of the very issue UTOPIA 
was seeking to litigate: the confidentiality of information that Hogan threatened to 
disclose. (R. 18-22.) 
who now presides over the matter in the district court, denied Hogan's motion on the 
ground that he had no jurisdiction and alternatively denied the motion on the merits. 
13 
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The district court provisionally granted UTOPIA'S Motion to Seal, on the basis of 
the following findings: 
a. The Verified Complaint contains confidential 
information of UTOPIA. 
b. Because the litigation concerns the threatened 
disclosure of UTOPIA'S confidential information, 
other filings in this litigation are likely to include, or at 
least refer to, such confidential information. 
c. The public disclosure of UTOPIA'S confidential 
information is likely to cause irreparable harm to 
UTOPIA and to cause the very harm that UTOPIA 
attempts to prevent by initiating this litigation. 
d. While court filings are presumptively open records, a 
litigant should be permitted to seek judicial relief 
without incurring the very harm the litigation is 
intended to prevent; therefore, the balance of interests 
favors sealing the Verified Complaint and other 
documents filed or to be filed in this litigation. 
(R. 95.) Notwithstanding the Order Sealing Records, the district court kept open the 
question of whether the record should be sealed, interlineating upon the Order that it 
would be reviewed at a hearing to be held the next day, April 19, 2011. (R.95.) 
At the hearing on Tuesday, April 19, 2011, Hogan's counsel specially appeared 
and argued against issuance of a TRO and the Motion to Seal. The Court nevertheless 
issued the TRO and maintained the seal, but noted that the question of sealing the records 
would be revisited at the preliminary injunction hearing, which was set for the following 
Tuesday, April 26, 2011.2 
2
 This hearing was held in chambers and (to counsel's knowledge) was not 
recorded. It is evidenced by the issuance of the TRO, signed and dated at the conclusion 
of that hearing and approved as to form by Hogan's counsel. (R. 98.) The fact that the 
14 
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On Friday, April 22,2011, Hogan's counsel again specially appeared and filed his 
Opposition to Issuance of Preliminary Injunction. (R. 101-20.) 
On Monday, April 25, 2011, the day before the scheduled hearing in this Court, 
Hogan filed in Federal Court his Complaint for the Violation of the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, the Violation of the Utah Protection of Public Employees 
Act, the Breach of Contract, the Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 
Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy, and Promissory Estoppel. 
Notwithstanding the lengthy title, this document was substantially the same as the draft 
complaint previously prepared by Hogan's counsel and included as part of Exhibit B to 
the sealed Verified Complaint in this action. {Compare R. 46-57 with Exhibit P-9.)3 
Hogan's federal complaint included the allegation: 
On April 4, 2011, Shaw responded to Hogan's demand letter. 
Shaw accused Hogan of blackmail and extortion. He also 
demanded that Hogan keep quiet about UTOPIA'S dealings 
seal was maintained and intended to be addressed at the later preliminary injunction 
hearing is evidenced in the transcript at the conclusion of the preliminary injunction 
hearing, in which the district court observes that, due to the lateness of the hour, that 
issue would be continued yet again. (R.480 at 211:12-21.) 
3
 The federal court subsequently dismissed all but Hogan's two contract claims, 
with a combined remaining value of no more than $26,640 (should Hogan prevail). 
While not part of the record in this matter, the relevant pleadings are publicly available 
on the federal court's docket. See Hogan v. Utah Telecommunications Open 
Infrastructure Agency, United States District Court for the District of Utah, case no: 
1:1 lcv64, docket no. 41 (Memorandum Decision and Order Granting in Part and 
Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Strike, 
dismissing all but Hogan's breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing claims), no. 61 (Memorandum Decision and Order on Pending Motions, 
denying reconsideration), and no. 63 (Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss for 
Want of Subject Matter Jurisdiction - in which Hogan now seeks to dismiss his own 
action and acknowledges that the two remaining claims have a value of only $26,640). 
15 
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with him. He also blamed Hogan for Marriott's failure to do 
anything related to the specific instance of sexual harassment 
cited in Hogan's demand letter. 
(Exhibit P-9 at ^  53.) 
As predicted by Hogan, the media immediately picked up Hogan's Federal 
Complaint. The Salt Lake Tribune posted as the lead article to its Money section on 
Tuesday morning, April 26, 2011, "Top UTOPIA exec sues over terminated employment 
contract." (R. 333.) Steven Overbeck, the reporter of the Tribune story, attended the 
evidentiary hearing on the preliminary injunction motion later that same afternoon.4 
Thus, as of the start of the evidentiary hearing, the principal goal of UTOPIA in bringing 
this litigation - achieving a judicial resolution of the parties' respective rights and 
obligations in advance of the public disclosure of information UTOPIA considered 
confidential and protected from disclosure by the confidentiality provision of Hogan's 
consulting agreement - had already been mooted by Hogan's unilateral action. 
UTOPIA nevertheless proceeded with the evidentiary hearing, for which it had 
prepared in advance of Hogan's conduct during the previous 24 hours, in order to clarify 
the scope of Hogan's contractual obligation of confidentiality. (R. 480.) At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Court denied the request for a preliminary injunction and 
dissolved the TRO. (R. 480 at 205:11-211:2, 213:7-9.) Because of the lateness of the 
hour, at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Court put off argument on the 
Motion to Seal until Thursday, April 28, 2011. (R. 480 at 211:12-212:19.) 
UTOPIA moved the Court in camera to close the hearing, but that request was 
opposed by Hogan and denied by the Court. 
16 
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Wednesday, April 27, 2011, UTOPIA formally withdrew its Motion to Seal and 
gave notice of the dismissal of its Verified Complaint, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41(a)(i). (R. 123.) Because a hearing had already been set on the Motion to 
Seal, counsel for UTOPIA advised the Court Clerk that the motion had been withdrawn. 
The Court Clerk responded that counsel for both parties were required to agree to take a 
hearing off calendar. Counsel for UTOPIA thereupon called Hogan's counsel, advised 
him of the withdrawal and dismissal, as well as the requirement to advise the Court to 
take the hearing off calendar. The next day, counsel for UTOPIA confirmed with the 
Court Clerk that Hogan's counsel had also called to confirm that the hearing should be 
taken off calendar and the hearing therefore had been taken off calendar. (R. 340-41.) 
UTOPIA thereafter understood that there was no impediment to publicizing the full 
breadth of court filings between the parties, particularly as a corrective to the one-sided 
view set forth in Hogan's federal complaint. (R. 322.) 
On May 6, 2011, Hogan moved for attorney fees in the amount of $17,246. (R. 
129.) Of that amount, less than half- $6,744 - related to work allegedly done prior to or 
at the preliminary injunction hearing. (R. 132.)5 Hogan also moved for an Order to 
Show Cause why UTOPIA should not be held in contempt for (allegedly) violating the 
Order Sealing Records. (R. 223-24.) Hogan also brought a motion to unseal the case, 
except for one letter that he deemed offensive. (R. 149-50, 158-85.) In a May 16, 2011, 
5
 This consists of "$1,919.00 in attorney fees related to the temporary restraining 
order;. . . $4,825.00 . . . in attorney fees related to the opposition to application for 
preliminary injunction, the hearing on the application and preparation of the order on the 
.hearing. . . . " (R. 132.) 
17 
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hearing on Hogan's motion to unseal, the district court concluded that none of the records 
in this case should be sealed. (R. 481 at 25:23-26-13.) 
On June 13, 2011, the district court heard argument on Hogan's attorney fees and 
contempt motions. The court denied both motions. (R. 466A-B, 482.) With regard to 
the contempt, the district court found there could be no contempt because (a) the court's 
subsequent express unsealing of the record mooted any motion for contempt for allegedly 
releasing sealed documents; and (b) the order sealing the records was only directed to 
(and only restrained) the court clerk and was not any restraint upon the parties. (R. 482 at 
11:23-13:16.) 
With regard to the Motion for Attorney Fees, the district court found that the 
underlying action was neither frivolous nor brought in bad faith. The court proceeded to 
find that UTOPIA'S prompt dismissal of the action after the denial of a preliminary 
injunction further indicated an absence of bad faith. (R. 482. at 22:15-25:20.) 
On June 27, 2011, the district court entered a minute entry, upholding UTOPIA'S 
right to terminate this action by voluntarily dismissing its Verified Complaint. (R. 470.) 
On July 19,2011, Hogan filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 472.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Hogan's application for attorney fees under Rule 65A was correctly denied. To 
the extent Hogan may seek fees, he is entitled to recover only those fees that would not 
have been incurred in this action but-for UTOPIA'S preliminary injunction motion. 
Hogan never carried his burden to identify and segregate such fees, instead seeking to 
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recover all fees he had incurred throughout the action. When an applicant fails to 
properly support his fee application, the district court is within its discretion to deny that 
application. 
The district court's denial of attorney fees under Utah Code § 78B- 5-825 should 
be summarily affirmed, because Hogan fails to marshal the evidence supporting that 
decision. The district court found that UTOPIA'S action was neither frivolous nor in bad 
faith. Hogan makes no effort to marshal the evidence for those findings, instead choosing 
to incorporate by reference his statement of facts "to meet his burden to marshal the 
evidence." Appellant's Brief at 31. Such an approach has been specifically disapproved 
by the Utah Supreme Court and merits a summary affirmance. 
Even if a summary affirmance were not warranted, the district court's factual 
findings were not clearly erroneous. It is not "bad faith" for a party to litigate the effect 
of a confidentiality clause drafted by its opponent, and a party confronted with what 
appears to be an extortionate demand is certainly within its rights to bring such a legal 
action. Likewise, an action does not lack merit merely because a party elects to notice 
dismissal it after an unfavorable preliminary injunction ruling that guts confidentiality. 
This is particularly true where, as Hogan had insisted, the parties proceeded to litigate 
those same claims in the venue of his choosing (United States district court), and 
UTOPIA prevailed. 
Hogan lacks standing to challenge the district court's refusal to hold UTOPIA in 
contempt for an alleged violation of the Order Sealing Records. Hogan was not 
adversely affected by that action nor would a contempt remedy Hogan's alleged harm, 
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because the subject records were all unsealed, and the subsequent third-party publications 
could still be made. Indeed, those publications could have been made on the basis of 
information publicly disclosed by Hogan in his own federal complaint. 
Even if Hogan had standing, however, the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in determining that UTOPIA committed no contempt. Hogan cannot meet the high 
burden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Order Sealing 
Records, on its face, gave UTOPIA notice that an order requested by UTOPIA to prevent 
the release of UTOPIA'S confidential information barred UTOPIA from releasing its own 
documents. Hogan's argument to the contrary, relying upon the application of "canons of 
construction" in conjunction with GRAMA and the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, is readily rejected. If a lengthy, researched legal opinion is necessary to 
determine whether conduct is a contempt, a party does not have fair notice that its 
conduct may be contemptible. 
ARGUMENT 
I. HOGAN HAS NO RIGHT TO ATTORNEY FEES HE WOULD 
OTHERWISE HAVE INCURRED IN THE LITIGATION, AND HE 
NEVER SEGREGATED ANY FEES INCURRED SOLELY AS THE 
RESULT OF UTOPIA5 S PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOTION. 
Under Utah case law, Rule 65 A authorizes an award of attorney fees to a party that 
successfully defeats a motion for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. 
Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 
1984) (holding that "[a]n injunction is wrongfully issued . . . if it is finally determined 
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that the applicant was not entitled to the injunction"). This, however, is but the beginning 
of the analysis. 
The successful party is only entitled to recover the attorney fees incurred solely 
attributable to opposing the motion. This but-for test has been emphasized multiple 
times. Thus, in Tholen v. Sandy City, 849 P.2d 592, 597 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (italics in 
original), cert denied 860 P.2d 943, this Court remanded an award of attorney fees, 
stating: 
Sandy is entitled only to those attorney fees which would not 
have been incurred but for the application for, and issuance 
of, the preliminary injunction. Fees which would have been 
incurred anyway, in the course of proving Sandy's 
entitlement to judgment and refuting Tholen's defenses, are 
not recoverable under Rule 65A. 
In IKON Office Solutions, this Court again vacated an award on the same ground: 
The fees a party incurs in showing that its opponent is 
unlikely to succeed on the merits will typically be fees that 
the party would have incurred in litigating the underlying 
lawsuit. Therefore, it is impossible to say that these fees 
would not have been incurred "but for" the application for, 
and issuance of, the wrongful order or injunction. [Citation 
omitted.] Thus, to the extent that the trial court awarded fees 
and costs that Uinta would have incurred in litigating the 
underlying lawsuit, the trial court erred, even if the fees and 
costs were incurred in defendants' effort to show that IKON 
was unlikely to succeed on the merits of the underlying suit. 
IKON Office Solutions v. Crook, 2000 UT App 217, f 20, 6 P.3d 1143. 
The "but for" distinction is significant. Under Rule 65A, at a preliminary 
injunction hearing, the district court may consolidate a trial on the merits with the 
evidentiary hearing on the preliminary injunction. See UTAH R. CiV. P. 65A (a)(2). Even 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
if the court does not expressly do so, "any evidence received upon an application for a 
preliminary injunction which would be admissible at the trial on the merits becomes part 
of the trial record and need not be repeated at the trial." Id. 
Moreover, where not all the attorney fees at issue are recoverable, "to recover any 
attorney fees at all, the prevailing party must apportion or separate out the recoverable 
fees from nonrecoverable one." Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, % 36, 94 
P.3d 193 (emphasis added). Where an applicant fails to do so, "the trial court may, in its 
discretion, deny fees altogether for the requesting party's failure to allocate." Foote v. 
Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 57 (Utah 1998).6 
Hogan submitted a blanket application for all fees he had incurred in the litigation, 
including fees incurred weeks after UTOPIA'S voluntary dismissal. (R. 138-40.) The 
affidavit in support of these fees made only the most generic breakdown of fees "related 
to the temporary restraining order" and "the opposition to .. . preliminary injunction" 
versus all other fees. (R. 132.) Amounts expended on those two efforts total $6,744, but 
there is no effort to break this down further between work addressing the merits of the 
underlying litigation (which is per se not recoverable - Tholen, 849 P.2d at 597) and 
other potentially recoverable work. Id. Thus, the district court was well within its 
authority to deny the fee application, as Hogan failed to carry his burden of 
demonstrating what (if any) fees were actually recoverable. 
Both Eggett and Foote involved an award of attorney fees for prevailing in a 
suit, rather than under Rule 65A. However, identical policy considerations apply: 
whatever the ground for an award of fees, an applicant is obligated to distinguish between 
his recoverable and unrecoverable fees. 
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Hogan's argument in favor of reversing the district court is that Judge Fratto 
"incorrectly defined 'wrongfully restrained5 . . . [to] require[] frivolousness or bad faith." 
Appellant's Brief at 20. Essentially, Hogan's argument is that the district court erred by 
conflating considerations for an award of fees under Rule 65A with considerations for an 
award of fees for a frivolous and bad faith action. His contention fails on multiple points. 
First, Hogan reads too much into the district court's comments from the bench 
prior to denying his motion. While it is correct that Judge Fratto referenced his finding 
that UTOPIA'S suit was neither frivolous nor in bad faith, this was in no small part due to 
the emphasis Hogan placed on this issue in his oral argument. (Compare R. 482 at 14:8-
15:8, 17:25-18:7, 21:5-11 (Hogan's argument for fees under Rule 65A) with R. 482 at 
15:16-17:18, 21:12-22:14 (Hogan's argument for fees for frivolous, bad faith action). 
Second, Hogan argued that the district court had already "found," at the 
preliminary injunction hearing, facts that this was "not. . . a legitimate lawsuit." (R. 482 
at 16:24-17:18.) Thus, Hogan is the one who conflated Rule 65A considerations with 
whether the lawsuit was frivolous and in bad faith. The district court then had to respond, 
explaining 
My comment regarding the merits of the case - a part of Rule 
65(a) [sic] is one must determine that you are likely to 
prevail, or that there should be some further litigation. My 
comments went to that. It was not a determination on the 
merits, certainly, of the lawsuit, itself, and the claims made in 
the complaint. I would not be able to do that until I heard the 
case . . . . 
(R. 482 at 24:18-24.) 
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Third, this Court may affirm the decision below "'if it is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record.5" CDC Restoration & Const v. Tradesmen 
Contractors, 2012 UT App 60, ^  50, P.3d (quoting Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 
58, \ 13, 52 P.3d 1158 (emphases, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Particularly, the Court may sustain the denial of a motion upon grounds set forth in the 
opposition. See Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App 278, \ 31, 989 P.2d 61. 
As UTOPIA argued below, the entire evidentiary hearing consisted of evidence 
that otherwise would have been elicited in a trial upon the merits. Litigation that usually 
spans months (or years), as the parties draft their pleadings, engage in discovery, and 
finally prepare for and try the matter, was in this case reduced to less than two weeks. In 
that regard, UTOPIA'S conduct in seeking an expedited resolution of this issue likely 
saved both sides the substantial attorney fees incurred in a lengthy litigation. 
UTOPIA made these arguments both in its written opposition and at oral 
argument. (R. 365-66, 482 at 20:6-21:3.) At the conclusion, the district court ruled in 
UTOPIAN favor. (R. 482 at 25:19-20.) UTOPIA respectfully submits that this Court 
should uphold that decision. 
II. HOGAN FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT UTOPIA'S ACTION WAS 
NEITHER FRIVOLOUS NOR IN BAD FAITH. 
When challenging a factual finding on appeal, the appellant's duty to marshal the 
evidence on appeal is high. He is not merely expected but required to 
"temporarily remove [his] own prejudices and folly embrace 
the adversary's position"; [he] must play the "devil's 
advocate." In so doing, appellant[] must present the evidence 
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in a light most favorable to the trial court and not attempt to 
construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case In 
sum, to properly marshal the evidence the challenging party 
must demonstrate how the court found the facts from the 
evidence and then explain why those findings contradict the 
clear weight of the evidence. 
United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35 at If 26 (quoting Chen, 2004 UT 82 at f 78, and 
Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 108,1f 19, 57 P.3d 1093). 
In this matter, the district court found that the action was not frivolous: "the action 
was based on contract. There was a contract, and the contract did have the provisions 
regarding confidentiality. So consequently . . . there was a basis for the action." (R. 482 
at 24:14-18.) In sum, when one is party to a contract and believes that a provision thereof 
is, or will be, violated, one has a nonfrivolous claim to bring to court, even if one does 
not ultimately prevail. This is what the district court found. 
Furthermore, the district court found that UTOPIA did not act in bad faith. In that 
court's assessment "nothing would suggest that" the action was in bad faith, and further, 
UTOPIA'S prompt dismissal of the action after its loss negated a finding of bad faith. (R. 
482 at 25:12-19.) 
Hogan's only effort to marshal the evidence in support of these findings is a 
summary statement that he "incorporates by reference the evidence in his statement of 
facts as if set forth in full herein to meet his burden to marshal the evidence in support of 
the trial court's finding." Appellant's Brief at 31. Such a practice is insufficient and is 
specifically criticized in both Chen and United Park City Mines Co.: "'Parties cannot 
discharge their duty by "simply providing] an exhaustive review of all evidence 
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presented at trial.'" United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35 at ^  26 (quoting Chen, 2004 
UT82at^f77). 
Nowhere in his brief does Hogan uplay the 'devil's advocate'" in "present[ing] the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court." Chen, 2004 UT 82 at ^  78. Instead, 
Hogan proceeds directly to argue with the trial court, to ask this Court to substitute his 
view of the evidence for that embraced by the district court. See Appellate's Brief at 21-
36. He proceeds to multiple factual assertions without any Record citation, because no 
such evidence was ever submitted, such as "UTOPIA lacked an honest belief in the 
propriety of its actions"; "UTOPIA knew that it could not enforce the confidentiality 
clause of the contract"; "UTOPIA disclosed the sealed records to third parties with the 
apparent intent of publishing defamatory information to misrepresent the actions of 
[Hogan] to the public." See Appellant's Brief at 32, 34 
Such conduct is, again, specifically censured. When the appellant in United Park 
City Mines did so, the Utah Supreme Court noted it had "merely re-argue[d] the factual 
case .. . presented in the trial court, leaving [appellee] and this court to bear the expense 
and time of performing the critical task of marshaling the evidence. This is unfair, 
inefficient, and unacceptable." United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35 at <f 26 (internal 
quotation marks omitted; ellipses in original). 
While no one may deny appellant's zealous advocacy, that zeal does not excuse 
misrepresenting the state of the record nor defalcating on his duty to the Court when he is 
obliged to argue against his case in support of the district court's factual findings. 
Because Hogan has failed to marshal the evidence, the Court can and should summarily 
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affirm the district court's findings that UTOPIA'S action was neither frivolous nor in bad 
faith. See United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35 at f 27 (summarily affirming factual 
findings due to appellant's failure to marshal the evidence). Thus, Hogan had no 
entitlement to an award of attorney fees under Utah Code § 78B-5-825. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS THAT UTOPIA'S ACTION WAS 
NEITHER FRIVOLOUS NOR IN BAD FAITH ARE NOT CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
Even if Hogan's failure to marshal the evidence were not fatal to his demand for 
attorney fees under Utah Code § 78B-5-S25, the Court should still affirm the decision 
below. Section 78B-5-825 authorizes an award of fees only where the action is both 
"without merit" and noi "brought... in good faith." UTAH CODE § 78B-5-825 (1). As 
noted above, the district court specifically found that Hogan met neither requirement. 
Hogan fails to carry the heavy burden of demonstrating that these findings are clearly 
erroneous. 
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if it is "against the clear weight of the 
evidence." State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997). This Court must be "left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Fisher v. 
Fisher, 2009 UT App 305, f 6, 221 P.3d 845. 
A. UTOPIA'S Action Was Not in Bad Faith. 
Litigation is not brought in good faith when (1) the party lacks an honest belief in 
the propriety of the litigation; (2) the party intends to take unconscionable advantage of 
the other side; or (3) the party acted with the knowledge that its actions would hinder, 
delay or defraud others. Gallegos v. Lloyd, 2008 UT App 40, f 15, 178 P.3d 922. 
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The undisputed evidence at the evidentiary hearing was that Hogan and UTOPIA 
are parties to a contract that included a confidentiality provision, running against Hogan. 
Whatever the proper scope of that provision (something not finally determined in the 
hearing), UTOPIA was entitled, in good faith, to believe that the provision meant 
something, as there is a decided rule against interpreting a contractual clause to be 
meaningless. See, e.g., South Ridge Homeowners' Ass 'n v. Brown, 2010 UT App 23, |^ 1, 
226 P.3d 758 ("When interpreting the plain language [of a contract], we look for a 
reading that harmonizes the provisions and avoids rendering any provision 
meaningless.") (quoting Peterson & Simpson v. IHC Health Servs., 2009 UT 54, ^13, 
217P.3d716). 
In March and April 2011, UTOPIA was confronted with a series of letters from 
Hogan (via counsel) threatening to disclose information that would create public, critical, 
and (by Hogan's account) destructive scrutiny of UTOPIA, if Hogan's demands for over 
$200,000 and a hand in choosing a new chief executive for UTOPIA were not met. (R. 
64-68.) 
UTOPIA fairly interpreted Hogan's demands as extortionate. (R. 72.) Hogan's 
demands, in fact, meet the statutory definition of extortion: 
As used in this section, extortion occurs when a person 
threatens to: 
(d) Accuse any person of a crime or expose him to hatred, 
contempt, or ridicule; or 
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(e) Reveal any information sought to be concealed by the 
person threatened.... 
Utah Code § 76-6-406 (2) (Theft by Extortion).7 
UTOPIA did one of the few things any person or entity can do in such a situation, 
but something particularly appropriate where one is the beneficiary of a contractual 
confidentiality provision: seek judicial protection against such a disclosure while seeking 
a determination of the parties' respective rights under the contract language. 
Moreover, none of UTOPIA'S conduct in commencing this litigation "took 
advantage" (much less "unconscionable advantage") or hindered, delayed, or defrauded 
Hogan. By bringing this action in the manner that it did, UTOPIA secured a quick 
determination of the parties' respective rights, at least with regard to whether the scope of 
the confidentiality provision could serve as a basis for restraining Hogan's publications in 
advance. 
Hogan's arguments to the contrary are lacking. First, Hogan argues that UTOPIA 
"violated [his] constitutional protections" to file his own lawsuit. Appellant's Brief at 22-
23. Evidence to support this contention is not merely lacking: the actual proceedings, 
both below and in the federal court, rebut this contention. Hogan did, in fact, file his 
lawsuit in federal court, while he was subject to the limitations of the TRO. (Exhibit P-
7
 If Hogan credibly believed that UTOPIA, or any person within UTOPIA, was 
engaged in wrongdoing, such information was not a legitimate bargaining chip for 
negotiating Hogan's financial pay-out. He had an ethical duty to disclose such 
information to the proper authorities without a view to any advantage to himself. 
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9.) Although he now chooses to argue to the contrary, clearly at the time Hogan did not 
consider that UTOPIA'S lawsuit impaired his ability to assert his claims in the least. 
Second, Hogan argues that all of UTOPIA'S "information was public." 
Appellant's Brief at 23-24. Hogan's support for this contention is the Government 
Records Access and Management Act ("GRAMA"). Id. Contrary to Hogan's blanket 
assertion, however, GRAMA explicitly allows for protected records. See UTAH CODE 
§ 63G-2-305. It is correct that UTOPIA failed, at the evidentiary hearing, to persuade the 
trial court that any protected records were threatened with disclosure, but a failure of 
evidence does not equate to the presence of bad faith. 
Third, Hogan argues that the confidentiality clause was unenforceable. 
Appellant's Brief at 25-27. Hogan relies upon a Pennsylvania decision, applying 
Pennsylvania law. Id. (citing Tribune-Review Publ'g Co. v. Westmoreland County Hous. 
Autk, 833 A.2d 112 (Pa. 2003)). Even if a Utah court were ultimately to find the 
Pennsylvania court's reasoning persuasive on an issue of Utah law, that decision would 
not negate a Utah litigant's genuine belief in its action. 
Fourth, Hogan contends that there was never a threat to disclose confidential 
information. Appellant's Brief at 27. Hogan cites no evidence in support of this 
argument. From UTOPIA'S perspective, Hogan's prelitigation demands for over 
$200,000 upon the threat that he would file a lawsuit bringing "public scrutiny" that 
"threatens to destroy the work of UTOPIA" could reasonably be construed as a threat. 
(R. 64.) Key to this threat was disclosure of information Hogan obtained during the 
course of rendering services under his Services Agreement, the very agreement that 
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bound Hogan not to disclose confidential information. As confidential information 
cannot be recaptured once disclosed, UTOPIA was well within the scope of good faith to 
take the initiative, by means of civil action, to protect itself. 
B. UTOPIA'S Action Was Not Meritless. 
For an action to be "without merit," it must frivolous or "of little weight or 
importance having no basis in law or fact." In re Olympus Constr., 2009 UT 29, <f 30, 
215 P.3d 129. As with the first requirement for an award of attorney fees under §78B-5~ 
825(1) (absence of good faith), Hogan cannot credibly argue that UTOPIA'S action was 
"without merit." As already discussed, the parties have a contract with a confidentiality 
provision composed by Hogan himself. Hogan threatened to disclose information about 
UTOPIA that Hogan, himself, acknowledged would be harmful to UTOPIA. Since 
Hogan's sole connection with UTOPIA was pursuant to the contract, with a 
confidentiality provision pertaining to all of Hogan's services, UTOPIA was entitled to 
seek a judicial interpretation as to the scope of that provision. Such a course is neither 
frivolous nor lacking in any legal or factual basis. 
Hogan argues for three pages that UTOPIA'S lawsuit lacked merit for multiple 
reasons. Appellant's Brief at 28-30. At the end of the day, however, all that Hogan's 
arguments amount to is the contention that, had UTOPIA chosen to continue this 
litigation, Hogan would have prevailed. That is not the standard. Generally speaking, 
half of all litigants "lose" on one or more claims. This is not tantamount to a 
determination that their claims or defenses had "no basis in law or fact." In re Olympus 
Constr., 2009 UT 29 at 130. 
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The frailty of Hogan's argument may be illustrated with one particular example. 
Hogan contends that UTOPIA'S request for declaratory relief was meritless, because 
(among other reasons) he "never requested to recover under the express contract beyond 
May 13, 2011 [its expiration date]." Appellant's Brief at 28. In Hogan's federal 
complaint, that is exactly what he sought to do, alleging that UTOPIA "led Hogan to 
understand that the contract would be renewed," and seeking $138,000 for an additional 
contract term. (Exhibit P-9 at U 143 0 
Hogan's promissory estoppel claim and a claim for wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy were set forth in the draft complaint he sent to UTOPIA that 
instigated this proceeding. (R. 53-56.) They were both asserted again in Hogan's federal 
complaint, filed while this action was pending. (Exhibit P-9 at ffl[ 130-56.) By its 
voluntary dismissal of this action, UTOPIA elected to litigate those claims in the federal 
court rather than here. UTOPIA won and Hogan lost on these and other claims before 
that court.8 In this regard, Hogan cannot even honestly represent that he is a "prevailing 
party" on these issues (a further requirement for fees under Utah Code § 78B-5-825).9 
See footnote 3, supra. 
9
 UTOPIA'S voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) precludes any prevailing 
party determination in this action: "[A] valid voluntary dismissal under Rule 41( a)(l) 
renders the proceedings . . . a nullity - it is as though the action had never been brought." 
Thiele v. Anderson, 1999 UT App 56, % 24, 975 P.2d 481 (quoting Barton v. Utah Transit 
Auth., 872 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Ptasynski v. Kinder Morgan G.P., 220 Fed. Appx. 876, 878 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Janssen v. Harris, 321 F.3d 998, 1000 (10th Cir.2003)). As UTOPIA chose to fight these 
claims in the federal court venue chosen by Hogan, the Court should not permit Hogan to 
disregard the results of that litigation. 
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In sum, neither of the district court's findings is against the clear weight of the 
evidence, nor should this Court have any "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed." Fisher, 2009 UT App 305 at If 6. The Court should therefore affirm 
the district court's denial of attorney fees under Utah Code § 78B-5-825. 
IV. HOGAN LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S DECISION THAT UTOPIA COMMITTED NO CONTEMPT OF 
THE ORDER SEALING RECORDS. 
Standing is a jurisdictional issue that may be raised at any time, even for the first 
time on appeal. Sonntag v. Ward, 2011 UT App 122, If 2, 253 P.3d 1120. "The most 
widely used test for standing 'requires a plaintiff to show some distinct and palpable 
injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute.'" Id. at If 3 
(quoting Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, *f 20, 82 
P.3d 1125). Hogan cannot establish any standing to challenge the District Court's refusal 
to hold UTOPIA in contempt of the Order Sealing Records. 
Standing is typically a three-part inquiry. Hogan "must first assert that he . . . has 
been adversely affected by the challenged actions. Second . . . allege a causal 
relationship between the challenged actions, the injury, and the relief requested. And 
third, the relief requested must be substantially likely to redress the injury claimed." Id. 
(citing Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd.9 2006 UT 74,119, 148 P.3d 960. Hogan cannot 
meet any of these requirements, much less all three. 
First, Hogan cannot show any adverse impact on him resulting from the district 
court's refusal to hold UTOPIA in contempt nor from UTOPIA'S alleged violation of the 
Order Sealing Records. Hogan presumes that, had the district court held UTOPIA in 
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contempt, Hogan would have been awarded his attorney fees for the entire action. (R. 
223 (requesting "Defendant's attorney fees incurred in this action")- There is no basis for 
doing so. 
"[T]he generally accepted rule is that the issuance of an order relating to contempt 
of court, or the holding of a party in contempt of court, are matters which are not 
mandatory upon the trial judge, but rest within his sound discretion." Bartholomew v. 
Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 1976). When confronted with the violation of its 
order, the district court could, within its discretion, fashion any appropriate remedy or 
even elect to ignore it. (Contempt is explicitly "not mandatory.") Hogan's position that 
he would recover his attorney fees is sheer speculation. 
Hogan's only case on point is notable for how it may be distinguished. In Marsh 
v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, 973 P.2d 988, the ex-husband sued the ex-wife and sought 
contempt against her for violation of a support order. Id. at K 5. That order was one 
entered by the court for the ex-husband's benefit, inasmuch as it required the ex-wife to 
make support payments. 
By contrast, the Order Sealing Records that Hogan alleges UTOPIA violated was 
entered at UTOPIA's request, over Hogan's objections. It was entered for UTOPIA'S 
benefit, upon express findings that release of the records could cause harm to UTOPIA 
by disclosing potentially confidential information. (R. 95.) Hogan was never an intended 
beneficiary (he argued against the confidentiality of the information), and the district 
court correctly concluded that, in any event, the purpose and effect of the order was 
solely to direct the actions of the court clerk. (R. 482 at 12:22-13:16.) 
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Hogan argues at length that the district court "made an error of law . . . by 
concluding that an order sealing records does not prohibit represented parties from 
disclosing sealed documents to third parties." Appellant's Brief at 39. He misses the 
fundamental point: whatever authority a court may have to seal records, the district court 
was interpreting the effect of a specific order that it had issued only a short time 
previously. No jurist could be better qualified to declare what was intended by an order 
than the jurist who issued'the order. 
Second, there is no causal relationship between the challenged actions, the injury, 
and the relief Hogan requests. Hogan asserts that the challenged action (UTOPIA'S 
release of records) caused his injury (the publication of negative news stories about 
Hogan). Appellant's Brief at 34-36. Essentially, Hogan seeks to hold UTOPIA liable for 
the conduct of third parties, with nothing but speculation on his part as to any influence 
UTOPIA may have exercised over those parties. 
In this regard, too, the Court should take note of the district court's mootness 
analysis, something that Hogan completely misapprehends. {See Appellant's Brief at 37-
38.) Hogan's claim of some harm from UTOPIA'S release of documents was mooted by 
the district court's unsealing of the file. (R. 482 at 12:9-10.) On its face, the harm 
asserted by Hogan arises from media outlets receiving litigation documents, period. 
Hogan has no evidence to suggest that the articles published about him would not have 
been published, or would have been less damaging, had they been published in May 2011 
(when the district court formally unsealed the case file) rather than in April. 
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Moreover, Hogan cannot connect UTOPIA'S action as the cause of his injury due 
to the fact that the allegedly damaging information that was published about him -
UTOPIA'S accusation that Hogan attempted to extort UTOPIA - had already been 
published by Hogan, in his own federal complaint, before any news story ran: 
On April 4, 2011, Shaw responded to Hogan's demand letter. 
Shaw accused Hogan of blackmail and extortion. He also 
demanded that Hogan keep quiet about UTOPIA'S dealings 
with him. He also blamed Hogan for Marriott's failure to do 
anything related to the specific instance of sexual harassment 
cited in Hogan's demand letter. 
(Exhibit P-9 at \ 53.) 
Third, for the reasons already listed above, Hogan cannot show that the relief 
requested is substantially likely to redress the injury claimed. Holding UTOPIA in 
contempt does nothing about the news stories already published. Considering that the 
records underlying those stories are not sealed, it does not even send a message that the 
stories are in any way erroneous. 
Hogan incorrectly argues that the harm would have been prevented "because [the 
district court] did not unseal the language the authors of the .. . articles used to imply that 
[Hogan] faced criminal charges of extortion and blackmail.... [T]he trial court struck 
the language used in the articles." Appellant's Brief at 38. Hogan misrepresents the 
record in this regard. At the hearing, the district court did not seal the offending 
language. Explicitly, the court unsealed "the entire record." (R. 481 at 28:4.) 
The district court granted Hogan's motion to strike the language, but pointed out 
that - contrary to Hogan's arguments before both that court and this one - when language 
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is "stricken/5 that simply means that the court will disregard it. It is not redacted or 
blacked out. (R. 481 at 27:21-28:7.) Thus, anyone receiving the documents - or for that 
matter, anyone submitting a GRAMA request to UTOPIA for the documents - can read 
all the language (including that which so offends Hogan), draw what conclusions they 
will, and publish what stories they might. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO HOLD UTOPIA IN CONTEMPT OF THE ORDER 
SEALING RECORDS. 
To establish a contempt, Hogan must show, not only that an order prohibited 
UTOPIA'S release of documents, but also that UTOPIA knew that the order did so. See 
State v. L.A., 2010 UT App 356, \ 11, 245 P.3d 213. Hogan must demonstrate this level 
of knowledge by clear and convincing evidence. Id at f^ 18 (citing Van Hake v. Thomas, 
759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988)). Moreover, because the decision to hold a party in 
contempt is discretionary, Hogan must show that Judge Fratto - the judge who entered 
the subject order and heard live testimony - abused his discretion in refusing to find any 
contempt. See Vicchrilli v. Tracy, 2011 UT App 354, 264 p.3d 760. These hurdles prove 
too high for Hogan. 
In State v. L.A., for example, L.A., the mother of a child in the juvenile justice 
system, was ordered to transport her son to meeting with the probation officer. The 
probation officer subsequently directed L.A. to take her son to detention, due to a failed 
drug test. When L.A. failed to do so, the trial court held her in contempt. This Court 
overturned a civil contempt against L.A., on the ground that, while the subject order 
required her to transport her son to "attend meetings," it did not direct her to obey any 
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and all commands of the probation officer, such as the command here to take her son to 
detention. State v. L.A., 2010 UT App 356 at ffif 13-15. 
Hogan's effort to assert a contempt by UTOPIA was similarly unavailing. Hogan 
sought to hold UTOPIA in contempt for violating the Order Sealing Records, but nothing 
in that Order barred UTOPIA from releasing the pleadings. To the contrary, the Order 
makes clear that the records have only been sealed (a) upon UTOPIA'S own motion, and 
(b) to prevent the disclosure of UTOPIA's confidential information. (R. 95.) 
Moreover, no statute prohibits UTOPIA'S distribution of the records, assuming 
that the records were still sealed after UTOPIA had withdrawn its motion. Utah's only 
statute regarding sealed records explicitly applies only to records provided to pro se 
litigants: 
Documents classified as private, protected, or sealed by court 
rule and are provided to a pro se litigant in the course of an 
action . . . may not be distributed, released, or displayed to 
any other person except the court, the other party and their 
counsel, or any other person who may be authorized by the 
court to inspect the documents. 
UTAH CODE § 78A-2-229 (1). On its face, this statute does not bar UTOPIA'S release of 
documents, because this litigation has no pro se litigants, much less any who were 
provided with documents. While counsel for Hogan initially purported to appear 
specially, the fact remains that, in every hearing before this Court, Hogan was 
represented by counsel. 
Hogan endeavors to argue that "canons of construction reveal[] that an order 
sealing records in a case applies to everyone." Appellant's Brief at 39. Not only did 
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Judge Fratto-expressly^ 
course, to the clerk.")), Hogan5 s argument fails to apply the clear rule for a contempt 
finding: did the order, on its face, give UTOPIA fair notice that an order UTOPIA had 
requested, to protect UTOPIA'S confidential information, precluded UTOPIA'S release of 
documents in its own possession? If it would require a legal opinion, rules of statutory 
construction, and extensive reference to GRAMA as Hogan must resort to, the answer is 
plainly "No." Hogan certainly does not carry his clear and convincing burden. 
Finally, as UTOPIA has previously pointed out, UTOPIA'S withdrawal of its 
Motion to Seal was tantamount to an unsealing of this case. See Guardian State Bank v. 
Stangl 778 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1989). UTOPIA readily concedes that the law on this point is 
by no means clear: the court in Stangl was considering the effect of withdrawing a post-
trial motion and determining the time for an appeal. The present situation is further 
complicated by the facts that (a) the Court had at least preliminarily signed by Order 
Sealing Records, but (b) also explicitly held the issue open for reconsideration. 
Thus, the law is uncertain, whether UTOPIA'S withdrawal of its Motion to Seal 
automatically mooted the Order Sealing Records, but this very uncertainty negates the 
required showing - for a civil contempt - that UTOPIA knew a release of records would 
be a violation: if the law is unclear, then by definition, it is not "sufficiently specific and 
definite as to leave no reasonable basis for doubt regarding its meaning." State v. LA., 
2010 UT App 356 at ^ 13 ("For the court to hold one in contempt of an order, that order 
must be . . . sufficiently specific and definite as to leave no reasonable basis for doubt 
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regarding its meaning.") (quoting Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh, 912 P.2d 452, 455 
(Utah Ct.App.1996) (ellipses in original)). 
VL AS THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULINGS SHOULD ALL BE AFFIRMED, 
HOGAN'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL SHOULD BE 
DENIED. 
A party must first be awarded attorney fees below before it is entitled to attorney 
fees on appeal. Golden Meadows Properties v. Strand, 2010 UT App 258,1j 13, 241 P.2d 
371 ("[W]hen a party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is 
also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.") (quoting Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 
P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added; quotation marks omitted; brackets in 
original)). 
When no fees were awarded below, but this Court remands for reconsideration of 
that issue, an appellant has not substantially prevailed, and no award of fees on appeal is 
made. Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, f 52, 217 P.3d 733. 
Hogan obtained no award of fees below, and even if one of his arguments were to 
succeed on appeal, the appropriate relief would be no more than to remand the action to 
consider whether the district court should award him fees. More to the point, however, 
all of Hogan's arguments should fail. In either situation, however, he is not entitled to his 
attorney fees on the appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, UTOPIA respectfully requests that the Court affirm the 
district court's orders. 
40 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
J ^ . 
DATED this ^ ^ ' d a y of Marchr^Q 1-2-
KIRTON McCONKIE 
Eric C. Olsen 
Stephen W. Geary 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
UTOPIA 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Eric C.Olson (4108) 
Stephen W. Geary (9635) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
eolson(a),kmclaw. com 
sgeary(a),kmclaw. com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff UTOPIA 
By. 
APR 18 2011 
SAD LAKE COUNTY 
tf 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH TELECOMMUNICATION OPEN 
INFRASTRUCTURE AGENCY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CHRIS HOGAN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER SEALING RECORDS 
Civil No. 
Judge F^ATTO 
A hearing came on before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Seal in the above-captioned 
case on Monday, April 18, 2011. Eric C. Olson, of Kirton & McConkie, appeared on behalf of 
the Plaintiff Utah Telecommunication Open Infrastructure Agency ("UTOPIA"). Defendant 
Chris Hogan did not appear, and counsel for UTOPIA represents that neither Hogan nor counsel 
for Hogan received notice of this hearing. 
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At the hearing the Court heard argument from UTOPIA regarding the Motion. Having 
considered the arguments made by counsel, and good cause appearing therefore, *&-
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Plaintiff s Motion to Seal is hereby GRANTED; 
2. The Verified Complaint and all other documents filed, or to be filed, in this 
litigation, are hereby designated as SEALED DOCUMENTS. 
3. The Court makes the following findings and conclusions: 
a. The Court has authority to seal records, pursuant to Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration 4-202.02(3)(I) and -.04. 
b. The Verified Complaint contains confidential information of UTOPIA. 
c. Because the litigation concerns the threatened disclosure of UTOPIA'S 
confidential information, other filings in tliis litigation are likely to include, or 
at least refer to, such confidential information. 
d. The public disclosure of UTOPIA'S confidential information is likely to cause 
irreparable harm to UTOPIA and to cause the very harm that UTOPIA 
attempts to prevent by initiating this litigation. 
e. While court filings are presumptively open records, a litigant should be 
permitted to seek judicial relief without incurring the very harm the litigation 
is intended to prevent; therefore, the balance of interests favors sealing the 
Verified Complaint and other documents filed or to be filed in this litigation. 
f. To the extent that this Order encompasses documents filed in this litigation 
that do not contain or reference confidential information, such documents are 
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best addressed on a case-by-case basis after such documents have been filed 
under seal and both parties have the opportunity to be heard by the Court 
thereon. Allowing such post-filing challenge to the sealing of a specific 
document will adequately address the balance of interests between open 
access to court records and UTOPIA'S right to protect its confidential 
information, 
g. The Court does not find another reasonable alternative to closure that is 
sufficient to protect UTOPIA'S confidential information. 
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136 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, SUITE 14,00 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAM 84111 SAMUEL J. SORKNSEN 
OF COUNSEL 
NofcMAN H. JACKSON 
JVDCEl, UTAH COURT OF APPEALS (RET. 
March 24,2011 
STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN 
ssc@ctlawfirm.11et 
David J, Shaw 
Kirton & McConkie 
Viafacsimile: 801.426.2101 
Re: Chris Hogan Complaint against UTOPIA 
Dear Mr. Shaw: 
The recent actions of UTOPIA'S Executive Director, Todd Marriott* have left Mr. 
Hogan perplexed and frustrated. While Mr. Hogan served as an independent 
contractor, Mr. Marriott lauded Mr. Hogan as the person who pulled UTOPIA through 
its challenges and who saved the Brigham City project, thus providing the credibility 
necessary to secure additional bonds. Now, in a matter of a few short weeks, Mr. Hogan 
has become the pariah, of UTOPIA and is unworthy to associate with it, 
Mr. Hogan is passionate about UTOPIA and wants nothing more than its success. 
Throughout the course of his dealings with UTOPIA, his primary objectives have been to 
protect the public trust and to protect the well-being of its member cities. These 
continue to be his primary objectives. He is acutely aware that public scrutiny spurred 
by members of the media threatens to destroy the work of UTOPIA. Although his 
lawsuit may be necessary to redress Mr. Hogan's rights under the contract and his ' 
expectations based on the conversations that he has had with the leaders of UTOPIA, he 
would prefer to resolve this case without public scrutiny. He wants UTOPIA to succeed, 
I understood from our conversation on March 21, 2011 that UTOPIA was taking 
the position that Mr. Hogan's contract was not terminated and that there is still an open 
discussion about renewal of that contract. The various actions of UTOPIA contradict 
your statement. From Mr. Hogan's perspective, if UTOPIA continues in its current 
course, it will fail. With the success of UTOPIA in mind, here.is a list of Mr. Hogan's 
requirements. If UTOPIA agrees to these requirements, Mr, Hogan will accept them in 
full satisfaction of his claims. A copy of Mr. Hogan's invoices from February i^  2011 to 
the present are enclosed with this letter (note that because March is mid-month the 
expenses for the month have not yet been determined and will be presented at a later 
time). These invoices must be paid regardless of whether the other terms in this letter 
are accepted and agreed to by the Executive Committee. Mr. Hogan still has a company 
computer and cell phone and will return them to the company upon demand by the 
company. 
CT 
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P a g e I 2 
1. Mr. Hogan demands the opportunity to speak freely, outside of the presence 
of Todd Marriott ("Mr. Marriott*), with UTOPIA'S Executive Board; 
2. UTOPIA must pay Mr. Hogan $161,000 for his expectation damages of 
employment for the next fourteen months; 
3. UTOPIA must pay Mr. Hogan $28,000 for the value of the use of an 
apartment as part of his employment contract; 
4. UTOPIA must pay Mr. Hogan $20,000 for punitive damages for the malicious 
and humiliating way in which it terminated his contract, terminated the 
company's lease of an apartment for him, harassed him and his landlord, and 
harassed his wife by sending a cease and desist text to her cell phone and 
5. UTOPIA must pay Mr. Hogan's legal fees of $10,000.00. 
At this time, Mr* Hogan intends to file his lawsuit. Mr. Hogan feels strongly that 
Mr. Marriott has failed to protect the public trust and UTOPIA'S member cities for the 
following reasons: 
First, Mr. Hogan has been under direct pressure from Mr+ Marriott to interview 
and hiTe a friend and neighbor of Mr, Marriott's, Gary Jones, for 'any5 position in the 
marketing department despite advising Mr. Marriott that there were no positions that fit 
this person's background. Mr. Hogan had previously made an offer for the position of 
Public Policy Director which is part of the marketing department with Mr, Marriott's 
approval Prior to the new Public Policy Director starting in the role, Mr. Marriott told 
Mr. Hogan he didn't remember giving permission to make the offer despite an email 
thread showing otherwise. Mr. Marriott said Gary Jones would be a much better fit for 
that position despite having no experience or education in government or public policy. 
After a heated discussion which involved Mr. Hogan vehemently resisting unfair 
advantage to a friend of Mr. Marriott and the unprofessional nature of retracting the 
offer to the original candidate, Mr. Marriott acquiesced. It has come to Mr. Hogan's 
attention that Mr. Marriott has recently hired this same Gary Jones at least in the short 
term to replace Mr. Hogan in a marketing director role. This appears to be the primary 
purpose for removing Mr. Hogan and is another indication of a consistent pattern of 
favoritism further outlined below. 
Second, Mr. Hogan believes that Mr, Marriott's conduct jeopardizes UTOPIA'S 
success. UTOPIA has been criticized and scrutinized by public officials and the media 
from the time it was created. Public opinion of UTOPIA remains tenuous, and even a 
small scandal could destroy any positive public opinion that it has built up. Inasmuch as 
UTOPIA is funded by taxpayer bonds, if the taxpayers of its member cities lose 
confidence in it, they will not continue to support the network through immediate and 
future bonding. Mr. Hogan believes that transparency and avoiding the appearance of 
impropriety are the only ways that UTOPIA can maintain public trust sufficient to 
receive the funding necessary to accomplish its mission. But Mr. Marriott has 
W$F; 
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jeopardized UTOPIA'S existence by failing to disclose UTOPIA'S dealings and critical 
information, which may have the appearance of impropriety. 
Mr. Marriott's conduct in the current Request For Proposal ("RFP") process to 
install the network underscores how his conduct jeopardizes the very existence of 
UTOPIA. Initially, the RPP began as requests for two independent jobs. Tetra Tech, a 
company that has disfavored status with UTOPIA, submitted a proposal. Ryan Marriott 
("Ryan Marriott"), Mr. Marriott's brother, was recently hired as an executive of Tetra 
Tech. The RFP was later withdrawn and is planned to be reissued as a consolidated 
RPP. Mr. Hogan has information that a major company intends to submit a proposal in 
which it would act as the general contractor and it would subcontract with Tetra Tech to 
provide curb to home installation. 
There may be nothing wrong with the company's proposal, but it could lead the 
public to believe that Mr. Marriott and his brother were engaging in favoritism. Were 
Ryan Marriott to benefit from the contract from UTOPIA without prior disclosure to the 
Executive Board of Utopia, the media or rejected applicants could destroy UTOPIA in 
the press. 
It was this eventuality that led Mr. Hogan to encourage Jarrod Pantier to bring 
this issue to the UTOPIA Executive Board to ensure that UTOPIA did not enter into a 
contract that endangered its continual success and existence. Or at the very least ensure 
there was complete transparency regarding the issue of possibly indirectly contracting 
with the disfavored Tetra Tech and Ryan Marriott. 
Even though Mr. Hogan was motivated by nothing more than the success of 
UTOPIA, Mr. Marriott, immediately thereafter, accused him of insubordination. 
Despite the fact that Mr. Hogan is not an employee of UTOPIA, Mr. Marriott prepared a 
termination agreement and presented it to Mr. Hogan telling him that he was dismissed 
from employment for insubordination. 
After Mr. Hogan declined to sign the termination agreement, Mr. Marriott began 
sending texts to Mr. Hogan's wife's cell phone to remind Mr. Hogan that he had agreed 
to keep his dealings with UTOPIA confidential. One of Mr, Marriott's employees also 
contacted the landlord (a prominent and influential political figure in the state of Utah) 
of the apartment where Mr. Hogan is living and directing him to deny Mr. Hogan access 
to the apartment. The landlord indicated the tone of the UTOPIA employee was 
combative and belligerent, causing him to question the professionalism of UTOPIA 
especially given that it is a public agency, The unprofessional nature with which this 
situation was handled left Mr. Hogan publicly humiliated with professionals whom he 
might attempt to seek employment with (the landlord is a key political figure in the sate 
of Utah and Managing Partner of a major PR firm in Salt Lake City). Mr. Hogan had to 
assume the lease to ensure that he could remain in the apartment. Mr. Marriott also 
locked Mr. Hogan out of his workplace. 
David J. Shaw 
March 24,2011 
P a g e I3 
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Mr- Hogan has also received information that after he refused to sign the 
termination agreement, a member of Mr, Marriott's executive staff has told employees 
of UTOPIA that Mr. Hogan had been committing crimes. The comment regarding 
crimes is slander and may in fact introduce and invoke an entirely separate legal liability 
against UTOPIA. 
Third, Mr. Hogan believes that Mr, Marriott has lost the vision of UTOPIA. 
Recently, Mr. Marriott proposed that UTOPIA move beyond providing the fiber-optic 
network to its member cities and become a service provider with an intent to "kill" other 
service providers. UTOPIA was not created to be a service provider that would dominate 
the market. Rather, it was created to provide necessary infrastructure to service 
providers who could compete against incumbent monopolies and duopolies. This 
competition would benefit the citizens of UTOPIA'S member cities by creating an 
environment that would increase the quality of available services while decreasing their 
cost. Mr. Marriott's proposal for UTOPIA to act as a service provider is contrary to the 
purpose and mission of UTOPIA and the intent of the law legislating inter-local 
municipal cooperatives. 
Fourth, and finally, Mr. Marriott has failed to protect UTOPIA from potential 
lawsuits stemming from a hostile work environment in which fear, dishonesty, 
backbiting, selfishness, sexual innuendo and other inappropriate conversations are 
cultivated without repercussion by UTOPIA Despite receiving complaints, his cavalier 
response in at least one incident further victimized the woman involved, exposing 
UTOPIA to liability for a sexual harassment lawsuit In Mr. Hogan's opinion the 
severity of the adverse affects of the culture are evidenced in the departure of six staff 
members in the last three weeks, including the VP imd Director of Marketing and the 
Director of Operations, immediately prior to the launch of UTOPIA'S most aggressive 
growth plan. 
Mr. Marriott has conducted himself unprofessionally and has endangered the 
success and existence of UTOPIA by granting favor to his friends and family, by not 
providing complete transparency to the UTOPIA stakeholders and by failing to protect 
the public trust Should Mr. Marriott be removed by the Executive Board as Executive 
Director, Mr. Hogan would consider returning to UTOPIA for a period, not to exceed 14 
months, under the following terms: 
1. UTOPIA must create and implement a plan immediately to begin the search for a 
new Executive Director. 
2. Mr. Hogan has no interest as serving as the Executive Director, but he does want 
to participate in the search for and the training of the new Executive Director. 
3. After UTOPIA finds and trains a new Executive Director, Mr, Hogan will present 
a succession plan for himself so there is a smooth transition. This plan will 
include a tender of his resignation immediately upon completing the transition to 
mm. 
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a new Executive Director and a new replacement for himself as the marketing 
consultant. 
4. Mr. Hogan will have the same access to UTOPIA'S technology, office, personnel 
and resources which he enjoyed before March 17, 2011 so long as he continues to 
act as a consultant to UTOPIA. 
5. In anticipation of his future resignation, Mr. Hogan and UTOPIA must agree to a 
mutually negotiated succession plan that would allow Mr, Hogan to terminate his 
contractual relationship with UTOPIA over a course of time that would allow for 
a smooth transition. 
6. UTOPIA must pay all money now owing to Mr. Hogan at the level described in 
bis current contract through the end of his extended contract. 
7. Mr, Hogan will continue to lease his Salt Lake apartment in his name, but 
UTOPIA must provide reimbursement for all expenses Mr. Hogan has assumed 
in the apartment lease that UTOPIA had been previously providing for him. 
Mr. Hogan also feels that it is necessary to address your allegations that he has 
breached his contract with UTOPIA by failing to develop and implement a web portal. 
First, a portal is understood to be a webpage or part of a website. Mr. Hogan developed 
a website in 2009 and has fulfilled his.obligation. Second, even if the website did not 
satisfy the expectations of UTOPIA and Mr. Hogan's obligation under the contract, two 
months remains before Mr. Hogan's deadline to develop and implement the web portal. 
But be would need unfettered access to systems, resources, and staff to develop and 
implement the web portal which he has hitherto been unable to get and he has been 
locked out of his workplace. Mr. Marriott has also dismissed him for insubordination. 
Third, UTOPIA does not have any funding to develop and implement the web portal. 
It is now impossible for Mr. Hogan to comply with the terms of the contract, and 
impossibility is a defense to any claim that he breached the contract. 
Again, Mr. Hogan wants nothing more than the success of UTOPIA and hopes 
that these problems can be resolved quickly so that UTOPIA can continue to move 
forward productively. This offer will remain open until April 4,, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. MST 
unless withdrawn before that rime. 
Enclosures 
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Hogan Partners LL I H W Q I C S 
3235 Soaring Eagle Lane DATE: March 23,2011 
Castle Rock, CO INVOICE # L16 
Phone 303.660.1863 ceil 303.725.3315 
BILL TO: 
UTOPIA 
2175 S Redwood Rd 
West Valley, Utah 84119 
(801) 990-5450 
Consulting Fee 
Monthly Fee February 11,500.00 
Payable to Hogan Partners 
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Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156) 
ssc@cflawfinn.net 
Craig L. Pankratz (U.S.B. No. 12194) 
CHRISTENSEN THORNTON, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3156 
Telephone: (801) 303-5800 . 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Chris Hogan 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CHRIS HOGAN, • COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff,. Case No. 
vs. Judge 
UTAH TELECOMMUMCATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE AGENCY, . • 
Defendant 
Plaintiff alleges as cause of action against defendants as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Christopher Hogan ("Hogan") is domiciled in the State of Colorado but has worked 
Monday through Friday in the State of Utah each week since May 9 2008. 
2. That Utah Telecommunication Open Infrastructure Agency, aka UTOPIA, (hereafter 
"UTOPIA"), an interlocal cooperative agency organized under the laws of the State of 
Utah, is a quasi governmental entity with its principal place of business in Layton City, 
Davis County, State of Utah; 
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3. This court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The amount in 
controversy exceeds $75,000.00 and the action is between citizens of different States, 
UTOPIA'S citizenship being determined based on its principal place of business. 
4. Venue is proper in the United States District Court of the District of Utah. 
5. That UTOPIA receives its funding primarily through taxpayer-funded bonds. 
6. That UTOPIA must comply with the same Request for Proposal (hereafter RPP) 
procedures that Utah governmental agencies must comply with when awarding contracts. 
7. That UTOPIA is subject to Utah's Governmental Records Access Management Act 
8. Based on information and belief, UTOPIA has been approved by the member cities to 
secure bond to fund the development of a municipal fiber optic infrastructure ("Municipal 
Fiber Project" or "MFP") for approximately $65 Million in the following eight cities: 
Perry, Payson, Midvale, Murray, Centerville, Layton, Orem, and West Valley City. The 
cities plan to sell the first one at approximately $20 Million and that would provide 
funding for year one of their five year plan. If they hit performance benchmarks, they 
would be allowed to sell another. 
9. Bidding on the MFP was initially planned to be opened for two separate phases, one for 
mainline construction of the network and the other for fiber drop installs. Hogan was 
made aware that an initial RFP was posted for respondents for either the mainline 
construction or fiber drop installs or both parts of the network, components. After initial 
bids were submitted the bidding process was terminated by UTOPIA. 
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10. UTOPIA then began to prepare a request for new bids to be submitted with the 
preference of one general contractor to oversee the entire project, rather than to have two 
phases. 
11. On information and belief, UTOPIA has not yet posted tbiis RFP nor awarded the contract 
for its Municipal Fiber Project. 
12. Based on information and belief, Corning, Inc. was planning to submit a bid as a general 
contractor. Corning has discussed using Tetra Tech a subcontractor under which Tetra 
Tech would install the curb to home portion of the network. 
13. On information and belief, Ryan Marriott is in upper management of Tetra Tech in the • 
Utah region. Ryan Marriott is also a brother to Todd Marriott, UTOPIA'S Executive 
Director ("Director"). 
14. In order to make sure the bidding process did not jeopardize the success of UTOPIA and 
in hopes of making the process transparent, Hogan suggested to Jarrod Pantier, 
UTOPIA'S Outside Plant Manager ("Pantier") that he disclose to the Executive Board, 
the relationship between Tetra Tech and the Director as well as the possibility that 
Corning may be having discussions with Tetra Tech about awarding the curb to home 
subcontract to Tetra Tech. 
15. That Hogan's motive in speaking with Pantier about tike potential conflict of interest was 
to protect UTOPIA and to prevent UTOPIA from entering into a contract that endangered 
UTOPIA'S continual success and existence. 
16. On information and belief, Pantier disclosed to Director the advice Hogan gave to him. 
3 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
17. Hogan realleges paragraphs 1 through 16 as though set forth in full hereat. 
18. On or about May 9, 2008, a representative of Utah Telecommunication Open 
Infrastructure Agency, a Utah Agency, hereafter "UTOPIA," offered to enter into a 
contract with Hogan. 
19. UTOPIA offered to pay Hogan $11,500 per month in exchange for Hogan's services as a 
Consultant to be responsible for all sales, marketing, business development, operations, 
IT, and engineering efforts regarding the UTOPIA network. 
20. Under the offer, Hogan would work as an independent contractor and not as an employee 
of UTOPIA. 
'21. Hogan would work as an independent contractor for UTOPIA for the period of twenty-
four (24) months. 
22. Hogan accepted UTOPIA'S offer. 
23. Hogan and UTOPIA memorialized their agreement in a written contract; 
24. The written contract was based upon valuable consideration. 
25. On or about May 9, 2008, the written contract, hereafter "the contract" was signed by 
Hogan and Todd Marriott (Director), Dave Shaw (General Counsel), Kirt Sudweeks 
(CFO), representatives of UTOPIA. 
26. In the contract, Hogan and UTOPIA agreed that any dispute arising from or related to the 
contract would be brought in Third Judicial District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, if 
in state court, or the United States District Court of Utah, if in federal court. 
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27. The contract did not contain a provision that defined when either party could terminate 
the contract before the expiration of the twenty-four (24) months. 
28. On or about March 17,2011, Todd Marriott unilaterally terminated the contract between 
Hogan and UTOPIA; ' " 
29. Todd Marriott accused Hogan of 'Insubordination," even though Hogan was an 
independent contractor and not an employee of UTOPIA. 
30. Todd Marriott terminated the contract because of Hogan's alleged insubordination. 
31. Hogan had performed all of his obligations as an independent contractor under the 
contract 
32. UTOPIA'S unilateral termination of the contract was without cause. 
33. Hogan's consulting agreement should be reinstated. 
34. As of March 17, 2011, UTOPIA had not paid the eleven-thousand-five-tamdred dollars 
($ 11,500) it owed to him for his services rendered in the month of February, 2011. 
35. As of March 16, 2011, UTOPIA had not paid the five-thousand-seveh-hundred-fifty 
dollars ($5,750) it owed to him for his services rendered in the month of March up to 
March 16,2011. . 
36. As of March 17,2011, two months remained under the contract; 
37. But for UTOPIA'S breach of the contract, Hogan would have received eleven-thousand-
five-hundred dollars ($11,500) each month for the remaining months under the contract. 
38. In total, Hogan claims that the company has caused him damages of $40,250.00 by 
breaching its contract with him. 
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.SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) 
39. Plaintiff reaffirms, realleges, and incorporates herein paragraphs 1-37 of this Complaint 
as if set forth in full. 
40. Every contract has an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
41. The UTOPIA breached the covenant of good faith' and fair dealing when they terminated 
the contract between, them and Hogan and through its actions subsequent to terminating 
the contract 
42. Director asked Hogan to work directly with Jarrod Pantier (OSP Manager) in preparing 
the RFP process and he praised the excellence of how well Hogan'had recently managed 
a similar RFP process in securing a marketing" ad agency to handle marketing work for 
UTOPIA for the same growth plani 
43. On information and belief, as aresult of the termination of Hogan's consulting 
agreement, Director has locked Hogan out of his office computer, his company cellular, 
phone and announced his termination to all employees at UTOPIA. 
44! Director sent a text on March 18,2011 to Hogan that stated as follows: "Chris, FYI— 
under article 4, the services you have performed are confidential and you have agreed to 
maintain the confidentiaelity [sic] of the same. Discussion of your internal knowledge of 
Utopia as result of the Services you have performed with any person or entity is in 
violation of article 4. You are directed to cease and desist all such activities". 
45. On information and belief, Director locked down company offices over the weekend. 
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46. On information and belief, on March 17,2011, Gloria Cortes contacted Jan Webb 
("Jan"), landlord of the American Towers apartment which UTOPIA leases for Hogan 
and indicated that UTOPIA would pay through the current lease term and that Hogan can 
remain in the apartment until the end of the current month when the lease would be 
terminated. 
47. On March 18,20115 Cortes called Jan a second time and asked Jan to get access card and 
keys from Hogan and have him vacate the Condo immecliately and to remove his 
personal belongings. Cortes indicated the lease would be terminated as of March 18 and 
requested written notification of the termination. Jan sent an email to Cortes with the 
written confirmation of the termination. 
48. Within hciufs of the second telephone call, Hogan spoke withLaVair. Hogan indicated 
that since UTOPIA terminated the lease, Hogan would pick up the cost of the unpaid 
balance personally. 
49. Cortes then called Jan Friday evening thanking her for the email of the termination of the 
lease and for refunding the balance of the lease for the remainder of the lease term. 
Cortes then asked to be allowed to enter the condo in order to take pictures and prove . 
there was no liability and to prove that Hogan's belongings were gone. 
50. LaVarr Webb CLaVarr") then got on the call and indicated that He and Jan owned the 
condo and since UTOPIA has already terminated the lease he can do anything he wants 
with his property. 
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51. A woman-believed to be Peggy Hathaway based on the name on the caller ID display 
and also believed to be an attorney-then began to speak and immediately became 
belligerent with the Webbs, said that Chris cannot stay in the condo and that this was a 
corporate lease, to which LaVarr said the lease has already been terminated. LaVarr then 
asked who she was and she said you don't need to know my name. 
52. The unidentified woman then informed LaVari that the phone conversation was being 
recorded. LaVarr objected to being recorded without his permission and questioned if 
that was legal. The woman stated it was legal and she could record the call and at that 
point stated abruptly to LaVarr that she was through with this call and hung up the phone. 
53. UTOPIA' actions caused damages to Hogan in an amount to be proven at trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy) 
54. Plaintiff reaffirms, Realleges, and incorporates herein paragraphs 1-50 of this Complaint 
as if set forth in full. ' 
55. The State of Utah has established a clear and substantial public policy to enforce private 
contracts and to prevent parties from breaching these contracts on the bases of pretexts. 
56. The State of Utah has also established a clear and substantial public policy requiring 
. parties to contracts to perform the terms of these contracts in good faith and with fair 
dealing. 
57. Plaintiff acquired a significant legal right when he contracted with UTOPIA to provide 
his professional services as an independent contractor. 
58. UTOPIA terminated the contract citing insubordination. 
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59. As an independent contractor, Hogan was not capable of ^subordination. 
60. UTOPIA violated the clear.public policy of the State of trtah by terminating the contract. 
61. A person who terminates a contract for professional services solely on the basis of 
seeking to avoid performing a contractual obligation to a person providing professional 
services is liable for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. . 
62. Hogan has undertaken all necessary action to mitigate his damages, including seeking 
alternate employment. 
63. UTOPIA' actions caused damages to Hogan in an amount to be proven at trial. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Promissory Estoppel) 
64. Plaintiff reaffirms, realleges, and incorporates herein paragraphs 1-60 of thiis Complaint 
as if set forth in full. 
65. Hogan's first contract with UTOPIAbegan in 2008 starting in May of 2008, going to 
September 2008. It was extended to May, 2009. Then the current contract from May 
2009 throughMay 15,2011. 
66. Although UTOPIA had not expressly agreed to renew the contract in May, Hogan and 
UTOPIA had engaged in multiple conversations that led Hogan to understand that the 
contract would be renewed. 
67. Because of the importance of the marketing department to the overall success of 
UTOPIA, Hogan believed that the sudden termination of a key consultant in this project 
would be very disruptive to the overall mission of UTOPIA. 
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68. Hogan discussed with Director and with UTOPIA counsel, Shaw, his intent to stay on 
with UTOPIA through the first year of the five year phase, from May 15,2011 to May 
15,2012. It is expected that the bond would be issued approximately on May 15,2011. 
Hogan had an expectation of continued employment as a consultant with UTOPIA at his 
current pay through May 15,2012. • 
69. This discussion of a succession plan was raised by Hogan because he wished to make the 
transition from him to his successor as smooth as possible so that the Executive Board 
would be comfortable with the new team that would complete UTOPIA'S mission. 
70. When the idea of a succession plan was presented to Director, the Director orally 
approved the idea in concept. Until March 17\ 2011, there ^ vas no .indication that 
Hogan's contract would not be renewed. There was no indication that contradicted the 
need for a succession plan. 
71. On hundred thirty eight thousand dollars ($138,000) would be the value of the anticipated 
wages for the subsequent 12 months - established based on Hogan's intent of remaining 
with UTOPIA through the first full year of the current five year plan; 
72. Thie conversations between UTOPIA and Hogan constituted an implied promise lhat the 
• contract would be renewed for an additional year. 
73. In reasonable reliance on UTOPIA' representations, Hogan was not seeking to provide 
. his professional services or to be employed elsewhere for the year following the 
termination of the contract. 
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74. Hogan's reliance was reasonable because he had been providing services as an 
independent contractor for UTOPIA for approximately 1hree years and had multiple 
conversations about his succession plan. 
75. UTOPIA knew or should have known that by discussing with Hogan about how he would 
terminate his services and train his successor within one year that Hogan would rely on 
the implied promise of renewing the contract for one year. 
76. UTOPIA was aware that Hogan rehed upon their promises and withheld searching for 
alternate employment because Hogan continued to provide his professional services 
under the contract. 
77. UTOPIA was aware of all material facts of or relating to the contract between the paities 
at the time Hogan continued providing his professional services to UTOPIA. 
78. Hogan was damaged by relying upon UTOPIA5 promises because he withheld from 
seeking alternate employment and instead continued providing professional services to 
UTOPIA. 
79. As a result of UTOPIA' actions, Plaintiff was damaged in the amount of $138,000. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays: 
1. That Hogan5 s consulting agreement be reinstated or alternatively that judgment be 
rendered against UTOPIA for the principal amount of $40,250.00 on the first cause of 
action; 
11 
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2. That judgment be rendered against UTOPIA for the interest due and continuing to accrue 
at the rate of 10% per annum, from March 17,2011, in an amount to be proven at time of 
trial; 
3. That judgment be rendered against UTOPIA in an amount to be proven at the time of trial 
on the second and third causes of action; 
4. That judgment be rendered against UTOPIA for the principal amount of $138,000.00 on 
the fourth cause of action; 
5. For costs of Court. 
DATED this %! day of March, 2011. 
Steve S. Christensen 
Craig L. Pankratz 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Serve Defendant at: 
2175 South Redwood Road 
West Valley City, UT 84119-1319 
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Plaintiff alleges as cause of action against defendants as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
L Christopher Hogan ("Hogan") is domiciled in the State of Colorado but has worked 
Monday through Friday k the State of Utah each week since May % 2008. 
2. That Utah Telecommunication Open Infrastructure Agency ("UTOPIA") is an inter-local 
cooperative entity and political subdivision of the State of Utah composed of sixteen 
Utah cities, 
3. Todd Marriott ("Marriott") currently serves as UTOPIA'S executive director and is 
domiciled in the State of Utah. 
4. There may be other individuals who in their offieial capacity with UTOPIA or in their 
individual capacity, who are liable under this Complaint 
5. This court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 IIS.C § 1.331 and 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(a). 
6. Venue is proper in the United States District Court of the District of Utah. 
7. UTOPIA is a group of sixteen Utah cities that joined together to form a fiber-optic 
network. The network brings fiher-to-the-premise technology to the cities, UTOPIA'S 
sixteen member cities are Brigham City, Cedar City, Cedar Hills, Centerville, Layton, 
Lindon, Midvale, Murray, Orenu Payson, Perry, Riverton, Tremonton, Vineyard, 
Washington, and West Valley City. 
8. UTOPIA receives its funding primarily through taxpayer-funded bonds. 
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9, UTOPIA must comply with the same Request for Proposal (RFP) procedures that Utah 
governmental agencies must comply with when awarding contracts* 
10. UTOPIA is subject to Utah's Governmental Records Access Management Act 
("GRAMA"). 
1L On or about May % 2009, Hogan entered into a contract with UTOPIA to provide it 
services as an independent contractor until May, 2011. Under the contract. Hogan was to 
receive compensation at the rate of $11,500 per month for the services he provided. 
"Services" were defined under the contract as "sales, marketing, business development, 
operations, IT, and engineering efforts regarding the UTOPIA network?* 
12. In the contract, Hogan and UTOPIA agreed that any dispute arising from or related to the 
contract would be brought in Third Judicial District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, if 
in state court, or the United States District Court of Utah, if in federal court. The contract 
also contained a confidentiality agreement related to the services Hogan performed for 
UTOPIA. 
13. Hogan provided services to UTOPIA as an independent contractor undl March, 201L 
14. Hogan's work substantially benefitted UTOPIA, In fact, Marriott praised Hogan as the 
person who pulled UTOPIA through many of its challenges, who saved a major UTOPIA 
project in Brigham City, and who has given UTOPIA the credibility necessary to secure 
additional bonds. 
15. Early in 2011, UTOPIA made Hogan the director of operations in addition to the 
responsibilities he already had. 
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16. Although UTOPIA had not expressly agreed to renew the contract in May, 2011, Hogan 
and UTOPIA, through Marriott and David Shaw ("Shaw"), UTOPIA'S general counsel, 
had engaged in multiple conversations that led Hogan to understand that the contract 
would be renewed. 
17. Because of the importance of the marketing department to die overall success of 
UTOPIA, Hogan believed that the sudden termination of a key consultant in this project 
would be very disruptive to the overall mission of UTOPIA. 
18. In January, 2011, Hogan discussed with Marriott and Shaw, his intent to stay on with 
UTOPIA through the first year of the five year phase after it received additional funding. 
It was expected initially that UTOPIA would receive the funding by February, 2011, but 
it was later determined that UTOPIA would not receive the funding until approximately 
May 15, 2011. Based on his discussions with Marriott and Shaw and the date that 
UTOPIA would receive the funding, Hogan had an expectation of continued employment 
as a consultant with UTOPIA at his current pay through May 15.2012. 
19. Based on information and belief, UTOPIA has been approved by the member cities to 
secure bond to fund the development of a municipal filler optic infrastructure ("Municipal 
Fiber Project" or "MFP") for approximately $65 Million in the following eight cities: 
Lindon, Brigham City, Midvale, Murray, Cenlervilie, Layton, Orem, and West Valley 
City. The cities plan to sell the first municipal fiber optic infrastructure at approximately 
$20 Million, which would provide funding for year one of their five year plan. If they hit 
performance benchmarks, they would be allowed to sell another. 
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20. Bidding ontheMFP was initially planned to be opened for two separate phases, one Tor 
mainline construction of the network and the other for fiber drop installs. Hogan was 
made aware that an initial RFP was posted for respondents for either the mainline 
construction or fiber drop installs or both parts of the network components, 
21. Tetra Tech submitted a bid to perfonn the fiber drop installs. 
22. Tetra Tech is a company that had disfavored status with UTOPIA. 
23. On information and belief, Ryan Marriott is in upper management of Tetra Tech in the 
Utah region, Ryan Marriott is also a brother to Marriott 
24. On information and belief, the bid submitted to perform the fiber drop installs from Tetra 
Tech contained cost amounts that were extremely close to the projected cost amounts 
developed by UTOPIA. 
•25, After initial bids were submitted the bidding process was terminated by UTOPIA. 
26. UTOPIA then began to prepare a request for new bids to be submitted with the 
preference of one general contractor to oversee the entire project, rather than to have two 
phases. 
27. On information and belief UTOPIA has not yet posted this RFP nor awarded the contract 
for its Municipal Fiber Project. 
28. Based on information and belief, Corning, Inc. was planning to submit a bid as a general 
contractor. Corning has discussed using Tetra Tech a subcontractor under which Tetra 
Tech would install the curb to home portion of the network. 
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29. In order to makesure the bidding process did not jeopardize the success of UTOPIA and,.......... •.: 
in hopes of making the process transparent, Hogan suggested to Jarrod Pantier, 
UTOPIAN Outside Plant Manager ("Pantier") that he ensure that the Executive Board 
knew about the relationship between Tetra Tech and Marriott as well as the possibility 
that Corning may be having discussions with Tetra Tech about awarding the curb to 
home subcontract to Tetra Tech. 
30. Hogan's motive in speaking with Pantier about the potential conflict of interest was to 
protect UTOPIA and to prevent UTOPIA from entering into a contract that could be 
illegal and would endanger UTOPIA'S continual success and existence. 
3 L On information and belief, Pantier disclosed to Marriott the advice Hogan gave to him. 
32. Soon after Pantier disclosed Hogan*s advice to Marriott, Marriott terminated the contract 
between Hogan and UTOPIA and requested that Hogan sign a termination agreement. 
33. Hogan would not sign the termination agreement. 
34. When Hogan would not sign a termination agreement, Marriott began sending texts to 
Hogan's wife's ceil phone to warn Hogan to keep quiet about UTOPIAN dealings. 
35. On or about March IS, 2011, UTOPIA employees attempted to evict Hogan from the 
apartment where he lived during the work week. The UTOPIA employees spoke with 
Hogan *s landlord and were combative and belligerent. 
36. Hogan had to assume the lease to ensure that he could remain in the apartment, 
37. On or about March 18, 201L Mairiott locked Hogan out of the office he used while 
providing services to UTOPIA, 
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38. On information and.belief, after Hogan refused to sign the termination agreement with 
UTOPIA, a member of Marriott's executive staff told UTOPIA employees that Hogan 
bad been committing crimes, 
39. On information and belief, after Marriott terminated Hogan, Marriott hired his neighbor 
and a previous business partner of his brother, Ryan Marriott, to fill Hogan's position. 
40. In addition to Hogan's relationship with Marriott and Shaw in UTOPIA, Hogan, Marriott, 
and Shaw had formed a non-profit corporation doing business as "GigNation." 
41. Hogan currently serves as GigNation's executive director. 
42. On information and belief, after Marriott and Shaw terminated UTOPIA'S contract with 
Hogan, they started making plans to oust Hogan from GigNation. 
43. Marriott and Shaw blocked Hogan from accessing GigNation's website by changing its 
passwords. 
44. Hogan sent Shaw multiple emails requesting access to the website. 
45. Shaw did not respond to Hogan. Instead, he said that because of the situation with 
UTOPIA, he could not ethically respond to Hogan's emails. 
46* Soon thereafter, Shaw sent Hogan* s attorney a notice of a special meeting with the 
purpose of replacing Hogan as GigNation's executive director. 
47. On information and belief, either Shaw or Marriott told representatives of Aerojet, a 
business considering involvement with GigNation, that Shaw and Marriott had "severed 
ties" with Hogan. 
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48. Hogan sought legal advice;, and in an attempt to get the attention of UTOPIA'S executive,... 
board, Hogan directed attorneys at Christensen Thornton PLLC to draft a mock 
complaint and to serve it on the executive board during its weekly meeting. 
49. Hogan hoped that the mock complaint would be sufficient to get the attention of the 
members of the executive board that he had been wrongfully terminated. The mock 
complaint failed to produce the intended result. 
50. On March 24, 2011, Marriott sent Hogan a letter. In the first paragraph, Marriott said, 
"As we discussed last Thursday, March 17, 2011* your actions specific to recent 
interactions with Mr. Jarrod Pantier are clearly outside the scope of that certain 
Professional Services Agreement, together with applicable Statements of Work, dated as 
of May 12,2009 ("Services Agreement")/* 
51. Because the mock complaint did not get any results, Hogan sent UTOPIA a demand letter 
on March 24, 2011. In the letter, Hogan outlined his demands and his concerns about the 
future of UTOPIA under Marriott's directions, 
52. The demand letter outlined four concerns about Marriott's leadership. First, Hogan 
outlined Marriott's attempts to employ Marriott's neighbor and friend in position with 
UTOPIA. Second, Hogan outlined how UTOPIA'S possible contract with Tetra Tech 
could destroy UTOPIA'S public image and eventually destroy UTOPIA itself. Third, 
Hogan illustrated how Marriott had lost the vision of UTOPIA. Fourth, Hogan outlined 
how Marriott had fostered a hostile work environment in which fear, dishonesty, 
backbiting, selfishness, sexual innuendo, and other inappropriate conversations are 
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cultivated without jpepercussion. Hogan cited one specific instance in which Marriott's 
cavalier response further victimized the involved woman, 
53. On April 4, 2011, Shaw responded to Hogan's demand letter, Shaw accused Hogan of 
blackmail and extortion. He also demanded that Hogan keep quiet about UTOPIA'S 
dealings with him. He also blamed Hogan for Marriott's failure to do anything related to 
the specific instance of sexual harassment cited to in Hogan's demand letter. 
54. In response to Shaw's letter, Hogan sent UTOPIA another letter. In the letter, Hogan 
outlined his objectives and thought processes that lead him to act as he had. He assured 
that he did not want anything that he was not legally entitled to receive. And he offered to 
enter into negotiations or formal mediation with the goal of reaching a mutually 
acceptable resolution. Additionally, relating to the instance of sexual harassment, Hogan 
reminded Shaw that he had not suggested that Marriott do nothing and outlined the 
course of action that he recommended that Marriot take. He also reminded Shaw that 
Marriott ignored his recommendations* 
55. In response to Hogan's attempt to clarify his position and to open the door to 
negotiations, UTOPIA filed a lawsuit in which it is seeking an injunction and declaratory 
judgment against Hogan. The injunction is to prohibit Hogan from "disclosing any 
information obtained during the course of rendering services under the Agreement." 
56. The information UTOPIA seeks to prevent Hogan from disclosing is Hogan's 
"perception of deficiencies in the leadership of UTOPIA'S executive director." 
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57. UTOPIA alleged that "Hogan has threatened.^ .violate the confidentiality requirements 
of the Agreement if he is not granted certain concessions and payments to which he 
would not otherwise be entitled under the terms of the Agreement/* 
58. Hogan has never threatened to disclose information to a third party. Instead, he has said 
that if UTOPIA is not willing remedy his wrongful termination by meeting his demands 
or negotiating a mutually acceptable resolution then he will have no other choice but to 
file a lawsuit, 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Violation of Right of Free Speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and 42 U.&G 1983} 
59. Hogan realleges paragraphs I through 58 as though set forth in full hereat. 
60. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution made applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects an 
individual's right to the freedom of speech. 
61. UTOPIA is a political subdivision of the State of Utah. 
62. UTOPIA'S actions constitute state action under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, and therefore, are conducted under the color of state law under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. 
63. A government entity cannot terminate a contract with an independent contractor because 
the independent contractor spoke publicly or privately about a matter of public concern. 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case 1:11 -cv-00064-TS Document 1 Filed 04/25/11 Page 11 of 25 
64, A government entity cannot refuse to renew a contract with an independent contractor 
because the independent contractor spoke publicly or privately about a matter of public 
concern, 
65, After he learned from Pantier that Hogan had expressed his concern that Tetra Tech's 
proposed involvement with UTOPIA presented a potential conflict of interest that 
jeopardized UTOPIA'S future success and existence, Marriott requested a meeting with 
Hogan. 
66, On March 16 2011, prior to the meeting, Marriott texted Hogan requesting that Hogan 
bring the company computer in Hogan 5s possession to the meeting, 
67, On or about March 17, 2011, Marriott, Shaw, Hogan and Kirt Sudweeks, UTOPIA'S 
Chief Financial Officer, held the requested meeting. Pantier also attended a portion of the 
meeting. 
68, Marriott informed Hogan that speaking with Pantier about Tetra Tech's involvement was 
outside the scope of his employment agreement with UTOPIA, 
69, As further memorialized in a letter from Marriott to Hogan on March 24. 20119 Marriott 
unilaterally terminated the contract between Hogan and UTOPIA because Hogan spoke 
to Pantier about his concerns that Tetra Tech's proposed involvement with UTOPIA 
presented a potential conflict of interest that jeopardized UTOPIA'S future success and 
existence. 
70, Marriott accused Hogan of 'Insubordination," even though Hogan was an independent 
contractor and not an employee of UTOPIA. 
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71. Shaw agreed with terminating the contract between UTOPIA and Hogan. 
72. Hogan's private speech about a matter of public concern was a substantial or motivating 
factor for UTOPIA'S decision to terminate the contract between UTOPIA and Hogan. 
73. Hogan's private speech about matters of public concern was a substantial or motivating 
factor for UTOPIA'S decision to terminate its contract and not to renew its contract with 
him for an additional year. 
74. As of March 17, 2011, two months remained under the contract and but for UTOPIA'S 
termination of the contract, Hogan would have received eleven-thousand-fiveJiundred 
dollars ($ 11,500) each month for the remaining months under the contract 
75. Had UTOPIA renewed the contract with Hogan, Hogan would have received eleven-
thousand-five-htmdred dollars ($11,500) each month for twelve months. 
76. In total, Hogan claims that UTOPIA has caused him damages of $23,000 for terminating 
the contract and damages of $138,000 for refusing to renew the contract with him for an 
additional year, 
77. On information and belief, UTOPIAN actions through Marriott and Shaw were motivated 
by evil motive or intent or involved reckless or callous indifference to the federally 
protected rights of Hogan. 
78. Hogan is entitled to punitive damages for the intentional, reckless or callous disregard of 
his rights by UTOPIA. 
79. Additionally, Hogan has retained an attorney, has accrued legal fees, and will continue to 
accrue legal fees to vindicate his right to free speech in an amount to be proven at trial 
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-••• • SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Violation of Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-3 (2010) for Taking Adverse Action against Hogan 
because Hogan Communicated in Good Faith the Existence of Any Waste of Public Funds, 
Property, or Manpower, or a Violation or Suspected Violation of a Law, Rtde, or Regulation 
Adopted under the Law of Utah, a Political Subdivision of Utah* or Any Recognized Entity of 
the United States.) 
80. Hogan realleges paragraphs I through 79 as though set forth in full hereat 
8L Utah law prohibits government employers from taking adverse action against an 
employee because the employee, or a person authorized to act on behalf of the employee, 
communicates in good faith the existence of any waste of public ftinds* property, or 
manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a laws rule, ox regulation adopted 
under the law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or any recognized entity of 
the United States. 
82. Adverse action means to discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an 
employee in any manner that affects the employee's employment, including 
compensation, terms, conditions, location, rights, immunities, promotions, or privileges. 
83. Utah law prohibits; government entities and government officials from engaging in 
nepotism, 
84. Utah taw also prohibits bid rigging. 
85. Hogan communicated with Pantier in good faith about his concern that the potential 
contract involving Tetra Tech could involve a conflict of interest, nepotism, and bid 
rigging. 
86. Hogan suffered an adverse action for communicating in good faith with Pantier about his 
concern when UTOPIA, through Marriott and Shaw? terminated its contract with him, 
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'87.Hogan suffered damages in the amount of $-161,000*-$23,000 for the two months 
remaining on the contract and $138,000 for the additional year that he would have 
worked for UTOPIA had it not terminated him for communicating in good faith with 
Pantier about the potential contract involving Tetra Tech. 
88. Additionally,'Hogan has retained an attorney, has accrued legal fees, and will continue to 
accrue legal fees because he was terminated for communicating in good faith with Pantier 
about the potential conflict of interest, nepotism, and bid rigging. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
89. Hogan realleges paragraphs 1 through 88 as though set forth In fill! hereat 
90. On or about May 9S 2O08? a representative UTOPIA offemd to enter into a contract with 
Hogan. 
91. UTOPIA offered to pay Hogan $11,500 per month in exchange for Hogan's sendees as a 
Consultant to be responsible for all sales, marketing, business development, operations, 
IT, and engineering efforts regarding the UTOPIA network. 
92. Under the offer, Hogan would work as an independent contractor and not as an employee 
of UTOPIA. 
93. Hogan would work as an independent contractor for UTOPIA for the period of twenty-
four (24) months. 
94. Hogan accepted UTOPIA'S offer. 
95. Hogan and UTOPIA memorialized their agreement in a written contract. 
96. The written contract was based upon valuable consideration. 
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97. On or about May 9, 2008, the written contract (the contract) was signed by Hogan, v 
Marriott, Shaw, and Kirt Sudweeks, representatives of UTOPIA, 
98. The contract did not contain a provision that defined when either party could terminate 
the contract before the expiration of the twenty-four (24) months. 
99. On or about March 17,2011, Marriott unilaterally terminated the contract between Hogan 
and UTOPIA. 
100. Marriott accused Hogan of "insubordination," even though Hogan was an 
independent contractor and not an employee of UTOPIA. 
101. Hogan had performed all of his obligations as an independent contractor under the 
contract up to the point it was terminated. 
102. UTOPIA'S unilateral termination of the contract was without cause. 
103. As of March 17,2011
 ? two months remained under the contract, 
104. But for UTOPIA'S breach of the contract, Hogan would have received eleven-
thousand-five-hundred dollars (SI 1,500) each month for the remaining months under the 
contract. 
105. In total, Hogan claims thai the company has caused him damages of $23,000 for 
breaching the contract. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) 
106. Hogan realleges paragraphs I through 105 as though set forth in full hereat 
107* Every contract has an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
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10%_ UTOPIA breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it terminated 
the contract between it and Hogan and through its actions subsequent to terminating the 
contract. 
109. Immediately prior to the termination of the contract, Marriott praised Hogan, He 
had previously credited Hogan as the person who pulled UTOPIA through its challenges, 
who saved a major UTOPIA project in Brigham City, and who has given UTOPIA the 
credibility necessary to secure additional bonds. 
110. But Marriott's attitude toward Hogan recently began to change. 
11L Marriott began pressuring Hogan to persuade Hogan to hire one of Marriott's 
neighbors, Gary Jones ("Jones") for "any'* position in the marketing department. 
112. Hogan advised Marriott that Jones was not a good fit for any positions currently 
open. 
113. Before telling Marriott that he would not hire Jones, Hogan had made an offer, 
with Marriott's approval, to another individual for the position of Public Policy Marriott 
which is part of the marketing department* 
114. Prior to the new Public Policy Marriott starting in the role, Marriott told Hogan he 
did not remember giving permission to make the offer despite an email thread showing 
otherwise. 
115. Marriott said Gary Jones would be a much better fit for that position despite 
having no experience or education in government or public policy. After Hogan's 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case 1:11 -cv-00064-TS Document 1 Filed 04/25/11 Page 17 of 25 
assertion that there, were:no positions that fit this person's background, Hogan was 
instructed to create a position for Jones, 
116. Marriott and Hogan engaged in a heated debate in which Hogan vehemently 
objected to granting unfair advantage to a friend of Marriott and the unprofessional 
nature of retracting the offer to the original candidate. 
117. Marriott acquiesced to Hogan's objections, 
118. On information and belief, after he unilaterally terminated the contract between 
Hogan and UTOPIA, Marriott immediately hired Jones to replace Hogan in the role of 
Marketing Director, Additionally, Marriott also hired Brett Iverson to help fill the void 
created by terminating Hogan* Brett Iverson is believed to have been a business partner 
with Ryan Marriott. 
119. On information and belief, as a result of the termination of Hogan's consulting 
agreement, Marriott locked Hogan out of his office computer and his company cellular 
phone and announced his termination to all employees at UTOPIA. 
120. Marriott sent a text on March 18, 2011 to Hogan on Hogan's wife's ceil phone 
that stated as follows: "Chris, FYI—under article 4, the services you have performed are 
confidential and you have agreed to maintain the confidentially [sic] of the same. 
Discussion of your internal knowledge of Utopia as result of the Services you have 
performed with any person or entity is in violation of article 4. You are directed to cease 
and desist all such activities". 
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121. On information and belief, Marriott locked down company offices over the 
weekend following the termination of Hogan. 
122. On information and belief, on March 17, 2011, Gloria Cortes, an employee of 
UTOPIA, contacted Jan Webb ("Jan"), landlord of the American Towers apartment 
which UTOPIA leases for Hogan and indicated that UTOPIA would pay through the 
current lease term and that Hogan can remain in the apartment until the end of the current 
month when the lease would be terminated. 
123. On March 18, 2011, Cortes called Jan a second time and asked Jan to get the 
access card and keys from Hogan and have him vacate the Condo immediately and to 
remove his personal belongings. Cortes indicated the lease would be terminated as of 
March 18 and requested written notification of the termination, Jan sent an email to 
Cortes with the written confirmation of the termination. 
124. Within hours of the second telephone call, Hogan spoke with LaVarr Webb 
(LaVarr), Jan's husband. Hogan indicated that since UTOPIA terminated the lease, 
Hogan would pick up the cost of the unpaid balance personally. 
125. Cortes then called Jan Friday evening thanking her for the email of the 
termination of the lease and for refunding the balance of the lease for the remainder of the 
lease term. Cortes then asked to be allowed to enter the condo in order to take pictures 
and prove there was no liability and to prove that Hogan's belongings were gone. 
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126. LaVarr then got on the call and indicated that He and Jan owned the condo and 
since UTOPIA has already terminated the lease he can do anything he wants with his 
property. 
127. A woman—believed to be Peggy Hathaway based on the name on the caller ID 
display and also believed to be an attorney—then began to speak and immediately 
became belligerent with the Webbs, said that Chris cannot stay in the condo, and that this 
was a corporate lease. LaVarr replied by saying that the corporate lease had already been 
terminated. LaVarr then asked who she was, and she said, "You don't need to know my 
name." 
128. The unidentified woman then informed LaVarr that the phone conversation was 
being recorded. LaVarr objected to being recorded without his permission and 
questioned if that was legal. The woman stated it was legal and she could record the call 
and at that point stated abruptly to LaVarr that she was through with this caU and hung up 
the phone. 
129. UTOPIA" actions caused damages to Hogan in an amount to be proven at trial. 
FIFTH. CAUSE OF ACTION 
{Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy) 
130. Hogan realleges paragraphs 1 through 129 as though s^i forth in foil hereat. 
131. The State of Utah has established a clear and substantial public policy to prevent 
government employers from retaliating against their employees for communicating their 
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concerns that the government employer may, be .engaging in or is about to engage in 
illegal activities. 
132, The State of Utah has also established a clear and substantial public policy 
requiring parties to contracts to perform the terms of these contracts in good faith and 
with fair dealing, 
133, Plaintiff acquired a significant legal right when he contracted with UTOPIA to 
provide his professional services as an independent contractor* 
134, UTOPIA terminated the contract citing insubordination* 
135, On information and belief UTOPIA'S allegM reason for terminating Hogan is 
pretext As an independent contractor, Hogan was not capable of insubordination. 
Instead, UTOPIA, through Marriott, terminated its contract with Hogan because he raised 
questions about whether the proposed involvement of Tetra Tech, a company employing 
Marriott's brother in its upper management, was in the best interests of UTOPIA or even 
legal. 
136, UTOPIA violated the clear public policy of the State of Utah by terminating the 
contact. 
137, Hogan has undertaken all necessary action to mitigate his damages, including 
seeking alternate employment. 
138, UTOPIA* actions caused damages to Hogan in an amount to be proven at trial 
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139. On information or belief, UTOPIA'S conduct was willful and malicious, or its 
conduct manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the 
rights of Hogan, 
140. Hogan is entitled to an award of punitive damages for the willful, malicious* 
knowing or recless disregard of his rights by UTOPIA. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Promissory Estoppel) 
141. Hogan realleges paragraphs 1 through 140 as though set forth in fell hereai 
142. Hogan's first contract with UTOPIA began in 2008 starting in May of 2008, 
going to September 2008. It was extended to May? 2009, Then they entered into the 
current contract from May 2009 through May 15,2011. 
143. Although UTOPIA had not expressly agreed to renew the contract in May, 2011, 
Hogan and UTOPIA, through Marriott and Shaw, had engaged in multiple conversations 
that led Hogan to understand that the contract would be renewed. 
144. Because of the importance of the marketing department to the overall success of 
UTOPIA, Hogan believed that the sudden termination of a key consultant in this project 
would be very disruptive to the overall mission of UTOPIA. 
145. In January, 2011, Hogan discussed with Marriott and Shaw, his intent to stay on 
with UTOPIA through the first year of the five year phase after it received additional 
funding* It was expected initially that UTOPIA would receive the funding by February, 
2011, but it was later determined that UTOPIA would not receive the funding until 
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approximately May 155 2011. Based on his discussions with Marriott and Shaw and the 
date that UTOPIA would receive the funding, Hogan had an expectation of continued 
employment as a consultant with UTOPIA at his current pay through May 15,2012, 
146. This discussion of a succession plan was raisisd by Hogan because he wished to 
make the transition from him to his successor as smooth as possible so that the Executive 
Board would be comfortable with the new team that would complete UTOPIA'S mission. 
147. When the idea of a succession plan was presented to Marriott, Marriott orally 
approved the idea in concept. Shaw was aware of the succession plan and did not object 
to i t Until March 17, 2011, there was no indication that Hogan's contract would not be 
renewed. There was no indication that contradicted the need for a succession plan. 
148. One hundred thirty eight thousand dollars ($138,000) would be the value of the 
anticipated wages for the subsequent 12 months—established based on Hogan's intent of 
remaining with UTOPIA through the first full year of the current five year plan, 
149. The conversations between UTOPIA and Hogan constituted an implied promise 
that the contract would be renewed for an additional year. 
150. In reasonable reliance on UTOPIA' representations, Hogan was not seeking to 
provide his professional services or to be employed elsewhere for the year following the 
temiination of the contract. In fact, even though he had received several xmsolicited job 
offers which included lucrative compensation packages, Hogan did not accept the offers 
because he anticipated being employed by UTOPIA. 
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151. Hogan's reliance was reasonable because he had been providing services as an 
independent contractor for UTOPIA for approximately three years and had multiple 
conversations about his succession plan. 
152. UTOPIA knew or should have known that by discussing with Hogan about how 
he would terminate his services and train his successor within one year that Hogan would 
rely on the implied promise of renewing the contract for one year. 
153. UTOPIA was aware that Hogan relied upon their promises and withheld actively 
searching for alternate employment because Hogan continued to provide his professional 
services under the contract. 
154. UTOPIA was aware of all material facts of or relating to the contract between the 
parties at the time Hogan continued providing his professional services to UTOPIA. 
155. Hogan was damaged by relying upon UTOPIA' promises because he withheld 
from seeking and accepting alternate employment and instead continued providing 
professional services to UTOPIA. 
156. As a result of UTOPIA' actions, Plaintiff was damaged in the amount of 
5138,000. 
WHEREFORE, Hogan prays 
1. That judgment be rendered against UTOPIA for the principal amount of $161,000 on the 
first cause of action; 
2. That judgment for punitive damages be rendered against UTOPIA on the first cause of 
action in an amount to be determined at the time of trial; 
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3. That judgment be rendered against UTOPIA for the principal amount of $161,000m the 
second cause of action; 
4 v That judgment be rendered against UTOPIA for the principal amount of $23,000 on the 
third cause of action; 
5. That judgment be rendered against UTOPIA in an amount to be proven at the time of trial 
on the fourth and fifth causes of action; 
6. That judgment for punitive damages be rendered against UTOPIA on the fifth cause of 
action in an amount to be determined at the time of trial; 
7. That judgment be rendered against UTOPIA for the principal amount of $138,000.00 on 
the sixth cause of action; 
8. That j udgment be rendered against UTOPIA for the interest due and continuing to accrue 
at the rate of 10% per annum, from March 17,2011, in an amount to be proven at time of 
trial; 
9. For attorney's fees in an amount to be proven at the time of trial; 
10. For costs of Court. 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Furthermore, Plaintiff hereby enters his demand for a trial by jury on the foregoing 
causes of action. /? 
DATED this ?>% (lay of April 201 h 
CHRISTE^SEN THOR>rf*#, PLL< 
StevrSf. Chrfstensen 
Craig L. Pankratz 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Serve Defendants at; 
2175 South Redwood Road 
West Valley City, UT 84119-1319 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on June 13, 2011) 
3 THE COURT: We're here with the defendant's motion for 
4 attorney's fees, an order to show cause regarding contempt, and 
5 a motion to strike the notice of dismissal. We've allotted an 
6 hour. I propose to divide this up. We have about 20 minutes 
7 on each of these motions. Let's start with actually the order 
8 to show cause. Your appearances and then the argument. 
9 MR. OLSON: Your Honor, Eric Olson and Steve Geary 
10 appearing on behalf of plaintiff. 
11 THE COURT: Gentlemen. 
12 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Steve Christensen for Chris Hogan, 
13 who is present. 
14 THE COURT: Gentlemen. Mr. Christensen. 
15 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, we have a few witnesses 
16 in the courtroom if needed, but we would ask the Court to 
17 invoke the exclusionary rule at the beginning of this hearing. 
18 THE COURT: Those who might potentially be witnesses in 
19 the order to show cause or the request for attorney's fees will 
20 need to remain outside the courtroom and may not discuss the 
21 matter until a conclusion fo this hearing. You'll have to 
22 monitor this yourselves. 
23 MR. OLSON: All right. 
24 THE COURT: Mr. Christensen. 
25 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, 
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as to the issue of contempt, the burden is on us to show three 
factors. First of all, that there is a clear order that was 
entered by the Court. That that order was in the knowledge of 
the other party — 
THE COURT: Mr. Christensen, I'm going to stop you 
here. I — in terms of the order to show cause, I think 
realistically, because you recognize that it may call for an 
evidentiary hearing, but I'd like to use this time to see if 
there is a need for an evidentiary hearing. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: All right. 
THE COURT: That always seems to revolve around the 
question as to whether there's any fact — material fact 
reasonably in dispute regarding the contempt. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, I think that is the point 
right there. I don't — I frankly don't know the answer about 
whether there is a fact in dispute, because in the opposition 
papers of paragraph 18 it appears that UTOPIA acknowledges that 
they understood that there was an order, and that they actually 
publicized the sealed documents. So until we hear from them, I 
don't know if there really is a dispute about whether they knew 
there was an order, and whether they violated the order. 
THE COURT: So you see this as the order was the 
injunction? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Actually I see the order as the order 
to seal the documents. 
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THE COURT: Oh, the order is the order to seal the 
documents. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: And they — 
THE COURT: That was an order — well, let me see. 
That's an order — the order sealing the documents is an order 
from me to the clerk; am I not correct? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I think that the order to seal is to 
the clerk, but it's also to the parties, because I don't think 
that — I mean, what happened in this case, our contention is 
that one of the parties who actually came to the Court and 
asked for the file to be sealed, took file — took the records 
that were sealed, and then delivered them to the public. So 
our — 
THE COURT: I see. Well, I just wanted to clarify 
that. So it's the order to seal the file, and they were aware 
of the order? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: They asked for the order. 
THE COURT: They have the ability to comply with the 
order? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Sure. I mean, they took an affirm-
ative step, is our allegation. They could have sat and done 
nothing. 
THE COURT: I see. The affirmative step that you say 
that they took was that they had disclosed these documents that 
had been sealed? 
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MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: I see, and I think that would cover -- that 
would cover all of the elements that would — 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I think it would. At paragraph 18 in 
their opposition, they indicate that essentially their defense 
is that they understood that their withdrawal of the motion 
essentially unsealed the file. So our argument to that would 
be that they were mistaken, and that their mistake as to a 
provision of law is not a defense under Utah Code Annotated 
Section 76-2-304, because no one in an official capacity 
represented that fact to them. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay. 
THE COURT: Let me see Mr. Olson's view on this. As I 
say, in terms of whether there's a need here for an evidentiary 
hearing with a material fact reasonably in dispute. 
MR. OLSON: Well, your Honor, the order was to the 
clerk. It was our motion, and upon findings by the Court 
paralleled the findings on which the TRO was entered. The 
TRO was clearly — or the motion for preliminary injunction 
as of April 26th was clearly rejected by this Court. 
The following day we took two steps. We noticed the 
dismissal of the case, and we withdrew the motion to seal, and 
we took it off calendar with the cooperation of Counsel here; 
and with that, the question arose are these documents under 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 seal in some way that would restrain us, UTOPIA, from — 
2 with the publicity circulating about the Federal lawsuit, 
3 make known the fact that there was also a State lawsuit and 
4 what its substance was. 
5 Our conclusion was that there was nothing to restrain 
6 the UTOPIA from making that information available, and we have 
7 no — we don't contend that UTOPIA didn't, at that point in 
8 time, with the motion to seal withdrawn, the hearing on the 
9 motion to seal off calendar and the case noticed for dismissal, 
10 UTOPIA believed, and they believe, based upon my understanding 
11 of the record, that there was no impediment to making the 
12 complaint in the State action as available as available as the 
13 complaint in the Federal action was. Particularly where the 
14 Federal action quotes from and characterizes the State action 
15 in the very allegations. 
16 In other words, Mr. Christensen had gone to Federal 
17 Court during the pendency of the TRO, and it filed the very 
18 same lawsuit that was attached to one of the exhibits -- I 
19 think the second exhibit, Exhibit 2, to the State Court 
20 complaint. He had filed that in that interim period, and that 
21 had reached the news media shortly before we had the hearing on 
22 April 26th. 
23 So at April 27th, thinking to bring this matter to 
2 4 conclusion and end all the expense, except Mr. Christensen's 
2 5 invitation to meet him in Federal Court on whatever divided the 
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parties, we concluded to notice the dismissal of this case, in 
the wake of the Court's rather direct and I think, you know, 
comprehensive determination with respect to the motion for 
preliminary injunction that was expressed on the evening of 
the 26th, and at the same time withdraw our motion to seal the 
record, since the matter was as of the order that the Court had 
entered on sealing the record, to be reconsidered at a later 
time. 
THE COURT: There was an order, though, to seal the 
file. 
MR. OLSON: There was. 
THE COURT: That was effective on — well, even to 
right — to now, isn't it? 
MR. OLSON: No, I believe — well, I understood that we 
considered the question of sealing in connection with the last 
three that was held here, and that the Court ruled that the 
matter would no longer be sealed, but that two paragraphs of 
one exhibit would be stricken as immaterial. That's what the 
last hearing we had, which I believe was a little over about a 
month ago dealt with, your Honor. 
THE COURT: So you see the status is — the file has 
been unsealed? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes, yes, and I believe that with our 
withdrawing a motion that was otherwise temporary on its face, 
and the case being dismissed, that would be a nullity in any 
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1 event. The way that Rule 41(a) works is you walk through the 
2 jurisprudence surrounding Rule 41(a). It's as if the action 
3 was never filed. 
4 While there may be some limitations on the clerk of 
5 the Court, because that's a ministerial thing as to the clerk's 
6 office, as to the parties, the parties were not subject to 
7 — we're no more subject to a contempt than Mr. Christensen 
8 would be for his having filed a paper that was attached to the 
9 complaint in this action during the pendency of the temporary 
10 restraining order. 
11 I'm a little taken aback that somehow Mr. Hogan 
12 doesn't, you know, seeking to enforce rules of confidentiality 
13 against the plaintiff that has — he's declined on his own 
14 behalf to live by. 
15 So your Honor, I don't think there's any contempt 
16 here. I think it's very unfortunate the amount of time and 
17 effort, including tying up some public official's time to come 
18 here to deal with something that basically there's no harm, 
19 there's no intent to do anything. 
20 There's a procedural gap here that has been largely a 
21 function of Mr. Hogan's refusal to let the matter be concluded, 
22 which is all we have asked. They filed their lawsuit in Federal 
23 Court, if that's where they want to be, and that's the nexus 
24 of this dispute, centers on a contract claim and some related 
25 claims that Mr. Hogan wants to make, we'll be more than happy 
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1 to meet them on the merits there. 
2 The Court made it abundantly clear at the hearing that 
3 with respect to any restraint that might be centered on the 
4 confidentiality provision, we were not going to prevail on 
5 that. I've always thought that the encouragement in this 
6 jurisdiction is towards a civility that includes Counsel 
7 recognizing when they are not going to prevail in a matter, 
8 and bringing that matter to conclusion rather than taking 
9 multiple appeals and seeking certiorary and everything else. 
10 That had been my determination the day after that hearing, was 
11 the bring this matter ro an end, and to go the Federal Court 
12 where we have Mr. Hogan already there and ready to do battle. 
13 Thank you, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. 
15 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, I think that there are 
16 no factual issues before the Court. I think that all of the 
17 argument was a legal — of a legal nature. Those legal points, 
18 it appears, are first of all that there was a misunderstanding 
19 as to what the effect of the Court's orders were. 
20 I disagree that Counsel and their clients are not 
21 bound by the Court's order to seal a file, because if the 
22 Court is trying to protect confidential information, which 
23 was the allegation in this case, for opposing Counsel or even 
24 the Counsel in this case who filed the motion to go out and 
25 distribute that information, would essentially nullify the 
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1 effect of the Court's order. So — 
2 THE COURT: I"m going to — before we go further, 
3 Nikki, can you — with the status, is the matter still sealed? 
4 COURT CLERK: No. 
5 THE COURT: It is not sealed? 
6 COURT CLERK: No. 
7 THE COURT: I see. All right. 
8 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I think Mr. --• I think that that's 
9 correct. Mr. Olson was correct that last time we were before 
10 your Honor in May, that the Court entered an order only 
11 redacting or taking out those two paragraphs, and at that 
12 time unsealed the file. 
13 So the focus of this motion was regarding actions that 
14 were taken and unilaterally sometime before that, which ended 
15 up putting the documents out, including the documents that this 
16 Court ended up striking; and the paragraphs that were stricken 
17 were leaked out into the media by UTOPIA, and we believe that 
18 it caused damage, but that's not necessarily the point of this 
19 hearing. The point of this hearing is that they had an order. 
20 They knew the order. They didn't have to go out and leak the 
21 information, but they did. 
22 Then the other point that they make legally is that 
23 they could just undercut the Court's order by dismissing the 
24 lawsuit; but I think as they've conceded in another context, 
25 which is attorney's fees, that this Court — even if that were 
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1 true, which we contend it's not, but even if -- even if they 
2 were able to file a 41(a) dismissal, I don't think it takes 
3 away the effect of this Court's order to seal a file. 
4 I mean, there are many, many cases where because of 
5 the confidentiality of the information in the Court's file, an 
6 order to seal remains in im perpetuity because that information 
7 should not ever be leaked out into the public. 
8 So similar to an attorney fee order, an order to seal 
9 is a collateral order, which this Court would maintain juris-
10 diction over, because this Court could, I believe, maintain an 
11 order to seal past dismissal, and this Court could also punish 
12 a party with contempt if they violated that order, regardless 
13 of the status; but as we've argued in our other papers, we 
14 don't believe that the dismissal was of effect anyway in this 
15 case, because there had been a response. Under State rules, 
16 the type of response that was made would have been satisfactory 
17 to avoid Rule 41(a). 
18 So our request is that the Court award attorney's 
19 fees to us under the contempt action as the sanction for the 
20 contempt. I assume the Court can throw people in jail and do 
21 other things, as well; but our request is that the Court award 
22 attorney's fees. 
23 THE COURT: Thank you. I'm prepared to make a decision 
24 here. It seems to me the material facts are not in dispute, 
25 and what we have here is a question of law. In the first 
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instance, as to — well, whether — this is a contempt for 
disobeying the order sealing the file. First, it seems to me 
that as a matter of law we have now unsealed the file, and the 
motion appears to be moot by that action. 
Substantively, however — well, that's number one. 
Number two, I agree with Mr. Christensen, the fact that the 
matter is dismissed would not — quite frankly relevant in 
terms of the contempt, if any there be, to sealing the file. 
Like I say, it seems to me it's moot because the file has 
become unsealed, but it would not become, if you will, moot 
because the case had been dismissed. 
We often have matters that have been resolved, 
disposed of, the file has been closed, but the file remains 
sealed, or in a private status or in various statutes, those 
remain, regardless of whether the case had been dismissed or 
otherwise disposed of. 
Number three, whether one can be in contempt — the 
legal question here that's begged by the situation is whether 
one can be in contempt by releasing copies, if you will, of 
what has been sealed by the Court, if one can be in contempt 
of the order sealing the file. 
It's an order directed, of course, to the clerk; and 
I'm not aware of any authority, nor has any been cited to me 
that that type of order works a restraint, because there is a 
difference between sealing the file and restraining others from 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-13-
1 disclosing any of the information. 
2 In that distinction is the great difference here. 
3 We often are — or not often, fortunately, but I have been 
4 confronted with situations in which people come in, look at 
5 files, a mistake has been made and portions of it have not been 
6 sealed. At least, because if they're sealed, you're not given 
7 that portion of the file. The question is whether the person 
8 accessed the file knowing it had been sealed. 
9 In that case it may be that someone accessing the file 
10 — in other words, a clerical error, you were given the file 
11 rather than sealed — that that would be a contempt of that 
12 order; but I don't see as a matter of law that the plaintiff — 
13 or that there can be contempt on the part of the plaintiff by 
14 — unless otherwise restrained from doing so, talking about 
15 disclosing copies of what has been sealed. Your motion is 
16 denied. 
17 Going on now to the attorney's fees. 
18 MR. OLSON: One moment, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Yeah. 
20 MR. OLSON: We have Mayor Winder of the West Valley 
21 City. I'd like to just let him know he's free to leave. 
22 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Can you just announce that generally 
23 so that the others know? 
24 MR. OLSON: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Let's entertain the argument, then, on the 
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1 attorney's fees. In some respects, Mr. Christensen, see if you 
2 agree with me, as I look through what had been offered here on 
3 this issue, it seemed to focus really on whether the lawsuit 
4 was frivolous, brought in bad faith and so forth. 
5 MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's probably the most arguable 
6 point, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: I'll let you go ahead and — 
8 . MR. CHRISTENSEN: There are — there is another basis 
9 for attorney's fees, and I almost believe it's uncontested, 
10 that the Court can and shall award attorney's fees under 65(a), 
11 which is the TRO basis for bringing the lawsuit and the pre-
12 liminary injunction hearing and petition motion, which is a 
13 separate basis from the one that the Court has referred to. 
14 I believe really the only contest with the request 
15 for attorney's fees under 65(a) was that on — that the Court 
16 can only award attorney's fees under 65(a) that were for the 
17 preliminary injunction proceedings. I don't think I saw any 
18 other opposition in respect to that part of the request. 
19 We've set out for the Court that our opposition to 
20 the preliminary injunction and the preparation for the hearing 
21 and the hearing in front of the Court and the preparation of 
22 the order for that hearing, all of those things have been 
23 distinguished out, and amounts to over $9,000 on that element, 
24 plus the additional fees that were incurred as set out in our 
25 supplemental affidavit on that point. 
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THE COURT: So what you're suggesting, under 65(a), I 
award you the fees because you are the prevailing party? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That we're the prevailing party and 
— the fees are awarded because the other party did not succeed 
in obtaining an injunction. So — 
THE COURT: So that's — you're the prevailing party; 
is that — 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Right, uh~huh. 
THE COURT: I see. In terms of bad faith, I mean, you 
did make that argument? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes, we did. 
THE COURT: What's the basis to — what basis do you 
have that the matter was brought in bad faith or was frivolous? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well — 
THE COURT: Factually. I mean, factually. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes, and we brought that issue — 
we brought that argument because under the code, under Utah 
Code 78(b)-5-825, it indicates that if a lawsuit or a cause 
of action is brought, that the prevailing party will be 
entitled — shall be entitled to attorney's fees if the 
action or defense was without merit, and not brought in good 
faith. So that's what the Court is referring to, that code 
section. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I believe the prevailing party is not 
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1 really in dispute, although there was some dispute about 
2 whether we could prevail if they filed a voluntary dismissal 
3 before the Court really determined whether or not a party 
4 prevailed or not. 
5 In this case the Court certainly made findings and an 
6 order over the bench in terms of whether they would prevail on 
7 the two causes of action that they brought. So I believe this 
8 case the Court actually did make a ruling in that regard, and 
9 that the Court indicated that they would not be able to prevail 
10 on its order on the injunction hearing; and that the causes of 
11 action they asserted were not something that this Court could 
12 entertain, because one was for an injunction which had no 
13 underlying legal basis, and one was for declaratory relief 
14 on a contract, which likewise lacked an underlying basis 
15 because the contract issue could not be resolved by declaratory 
16 reliefs. 
17 So we believe that we were the prevailing party; and 
18 the next question is whether they acted in good faith. The 
19 basis why we believe they have not acted in good faith is that 
20 the reason for filing the lawsuit was not legitimate. They 
21 claimed to bring the lawsuit to protect UTOPIA from two things. 
22 No. 1, from a threat of Chris Hogan to disclose confidential 
23 information; and No. 2, to protect confidential information. 
24 At the hearing the Court made findings on both of 
25 those — on both of those elements. First of all, the Court 
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found that there had been no threat by Chris Hogan to disclose 
confidential information. Second of all, the Court found that 
they had not identified any confidential information that they 
were seeking to protect. 
So on both of the factual basis for which they filed 
the lawsuit, they were not able to bring to the Court any — 
any proof or any reason justifying that filing. So there's 
sort of this underlying idea that they were trying to stop 
Mr. Hogan from, filing a Federal lawsuit, but that also would 
not be a legitimate lawsuit. 
I don't believe there's any basis under the law to 
prevent someone from filing a lawsuit; and because there was 
no basis, because they couldn't articulate a basis and because 
there is no basis, then we believe -- because of those things 
we believe there is no good faith in bringing that lawsuit to 
the Court. There's no — no hope that they had in prevailing 
with the information that they had. So since there's not good 
faith, our argument is that there must be bad faith. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Let me — before you — before 
you sit down, let me clarify, Mr. Christensen — 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: — your prevailing party under Rule 65(a), 
the authority for that is specifically what? That is, the 
prevailing party, under 65(a), you're entitled to fees? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: In 65(a) — it's a little bit hidden 
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in the rule, because it is really coming out of the section 
that describes the bond. 
THE COURT: Oh, well — 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That the Court shall issue a bond, 
without — and it's a "shall." The purpose of the bond is to 
pay — in part, it's to pay for the expenses and costs and 
attorney's fees of the party who prevails. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
MR. OLSON: Your Honor, when I bring a lawsuit, I'm 
fully prepared to lose, but I'm generally not prepared to be 
accused of acting in bad faith and for advancing a cause that 
was without merit. 
In this instance I guess that's what I am here to 
face; and I'll start by saying that we did have a contract 
written by Mr. Hogan, the evidence showed. It did make 
a promise to UTOPIA to maintain a rather broad array of 
information in confidence. 
We have before us an exchange of letters with 
Mr. Hogan's Counsel, in which Mr. Hogan''s Counsel indicated 
that he was going to disclose information, and file a lawsuit 
and make known things that, in his own words, would cause 
irreparable harm to UTOPIA. 
We felt because of the admissions that Mr. Hogan's 
Counsel made in the two or three communications that we had had 
with him, that we have before us a rather grave situation. 
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1 Particularly on the eve of — as Mr. Hogan described it — 
2 critical bonding decisions to be made by financial institutions 
3 that would determine, as Mr. Hogan saw it, the fate of UTOPIA. 
4 As a consequence we analyzed the contract and saw that 
5 it had broad confidentiality language. We analyzed the content 
6 of the information presented by Counsel on behalf of Mr. Hogan, 
7 and concluded that there was really no adequate remedy of law, 
8 and that our option was to seek injunctive relief, recognizing 
9 that when you're trying to restrain information, it is always a 
10 challenging thing to articulate a reason that puts the Court in 
11 a comfortable place about granting that relief. 
12 I think the Court manifested some skepticism at the 
13 time that the TRO was entered. We brought this action nonethe-
14 less feeling that we were entitled to see the process through, 
15 make a record, and we were prepared to accept that if the Court 
16 ruled against us, that is what happens in lawsuits. 
17 Fifty percent of the time — or fifty percent of 
18 the people win and fifty percent of the people lose. A rare 
19 fraction of those folks that lose are called to account on the 
20 question of whether or not the action that they brought had 
21 merit and was brought in good faith. 
22 Here, I've explained to the Court the reasoning for 
2 3 why we brought the lawsuit in the manner that UTOPIA did, and 
24 that we felt it had merit because it was contractually based. 
25 We felt it had merit because there was, by the admission of the 
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1 defendant, potential, irreparable harm if disclosures were 
2 made, and we felt that it was appropriate thing to do in order 
3 to test the language of the contract and to seek some restraint 
4 on Mr. Hogan. We believe that that more than meets the standard 
5 under 78(b)-5-825. 
6 With respect to Rule 65(a), to the extent that there 
7 might be by implication some right to a party who defeats a 
8 motion for preliminary injunction to claim some measure of 
9 attorney's fees, I would just note for the Court that this 
10 case is now over by our unilateral action, and we have admitted 
11 we lost. There is no need for further proceedings. 
12 This case was resolved in the most efficient way 
13 possible. That is by a hearing on short order before this 
14 Court on the core of the relief that we were seeking, and a 
15 further acknowledgment by our client that they would go to 
16 Federal Court, the forum of Mr. Hogan's choosing, and complete 
17 whatever matters need to be completed in order to sever the 
18 relationship with Mr. Hogan. 
19 I believe that we have done this as efficiently, as 
20 economically, and as much above the table as we could possibly 
21 have done so without inviting Counsel into our offices to join 
22 us in our consultations with our client. I believe under those 
23 circumstances we have very little to apologize for, except the 
24 fact that we have had the, I guess, the lack of machismo to 
25 actually admit we've been defeated, and to take that knowledge 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-21-
1 and act upon it in a prompt and expeditious manner. To that I 
2 will plead guilty; but I think that is, in the Courts of this 
3 State, more of a virtue than a vice. Thank you, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Christensen. 
5 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, your Honor, starting with 
6 the Rule 65(a), there has been no opposition to the award 
7 of our attorney's fees, to their reasonableness, to the 
8 appropriateness of the award under the rule, other than the 
9 request that it be confined to Rule 65(a) actions. So, your 
10 Honor, we ask for an award of the attorney's fees we've 
11 requested under that rule because it's unopposed. 
12 In terms of the good faith basis, essentially what 
13 Counsel has said is that we thought we were doing what we 
14 needed to do, but the question is an objective question, not 
15 a subjective question. The objective question is whether there 
16 was any factual or legal basis for them to think what they 
17 thought. Our con — our motion is that they did not have a 
18 factual or a legal basis to think what they thought. 
19 First of all, they claim that Mr. Hogan had made some 
20 threats to them. All Mr. Hogan did was tell them that "I plan 
21 to file a lawsuit." I mean, it's noticeable that because they 
22 are a government entity, he is required by statute to give that 
23 notice to them. 
24 Giving them notice that he plans to file a lawsuit is 
25 not a threat of the disclosure of confidential information. He 
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1 didn't make that threat. The Court found that he didn't make 
2 that threat. So for them to say that they saw a threat in what 
3 he wrote to them was not objectively supportable. Because 
4 there wasn't a good faith basis for them to say there was such 
5 a threat, there wasn't a good faith basis for them to file a 
6 lawsuit on that basis. 
7 The second thing is that they -- once they had done 
8 it, they decided they're going to see the process through and 
9 make a record. Well, a record of what? I mean, for what? 
10 That's not — I mean, starting a lawsuit on the wrong foot is 
11 not a reason to continue the lawsuit through. Because they 
12 haven't shown a good faith, legal basis or factual basis to 
13 bring the lawsuit at all, we ask the Court to award fees on the 
14 statute, as well. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you. I think I understand everyone's 
16 position. I appreciate your efforts. I'm prepared to make a 
17 ruling. Request for attorney's fees, it's axiomatic, if you 
18 will. In order to be awarded attorney's fees, you either have 
19 a law that — or rule that — a statute or rule that gives you 
20 the fees, or you have a contract in which the parties have 
21 agreed to award fees. 
22 In terms of the preliminary injunction hearing, the 
23 argument has been that — of course we're relying on this rule 
24 — that in 65(a), which is of course injunctions, that would 
25 award us attorney fees, as the prevailing party. Specifically 
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under the security requirement by implication, that should give 
us attorney's fees, award us attorney's fees because we did 
prevail. 
Indeed you did prevail, and indeed there is this 
provision regarding the posting of a security; but I think the 
implication that you seek the inference, if you will, from that 
rule, that the prevailing party is entitled to their attorney's 
fees is not merited. This concerns before an injunction is 
issued, that there be a security. Although I can find where 
it says that no such security would be required of various 
parties, and it is -- it is contingent on a wrongful order, 
not who's the prevailing party. It is a wrongful order. 
So we're sort of back to, if you will, even by impli 
— I don't think we get the implication here, but we're back to 
your — the rules that would indicate and the law that would 
indicate that where a matter has been brought frivolous — as a 
frivolous, or brought in bad faith, that you would be entitled 
to attorney's fees. 
That would be ~- actually could be either the 
complaint, because that was brought, or the injunction; but 
it is incumbent on you showing that there has been bad faith, 
or that the action was frivolous. The word "frivolous," of 
course, does not mean that it was without merit. Frivolous 
goes well beyond that. Indeed, the fact that you're not the 
prevailing party does not mean that it's — the matter was 
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frivolous. 
An implication both in bad faith and frivolous that 
there was no basis for bringing the action, for seeking the 
relief in terms of the injunction, and certainly with bad — 
in bad faith is that I'm bringing this action, doing these 
things for ulterior motives, bad reasons, to delay — to delay 
matters, to harass, to — and do those sorts of things. So it 
goes well beyond who prevailed. 
In fact, who prevailed is fairly irrelevant in this 
analysis. It really goes to the — for example, frivolous, 
that there was no -- there was no legal basis at all to bring 
your action. That would be a frivolous action. However, 
without further analysis here, I think all that is concluded 
with the fact that the action was an action based on contract. 
There was a contract, and the contract did have the provisions 
regarding confidentiality. 
So consequently this — there was a basis for the 
action. My comment regarding the merits of the case — a 
part of Rule 65(a) is one must determine that you are likely 
to prevail, or that there should be some further litigation. 
My comments went to that. It was not a determination on the 
merits, certainly, of the lawsuit, itself, and the claims made 
in the complaint. 
I would not be able to do that until I heard the case, 
I suppose; but I was obliged, I believe, to make a determi-
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nation as to whether — whether one would prevail — was likely 
to prevail. It seemed to me that really is a matter of law, 
given what facts I had — what I had that the plaintiff was not 
likely to prevail, and in fact was precluded, it would seem, 
from bringing this action. 
That's really a question both of law and fact; and 
so it seems to me for these reasons that there be no basis to 
award attorney's fees. Rule 65(a) doesn't provide that. There 
is no contract in terms of this injunctive relief that was 
sought; and it seems to me that you have to show the burden now 
with, of course, the defendant, that the action is frivolous 
or brought in bad faith. There's nothing in front of me that 
would suggest that. 
In fact, the further — the further indication here, 
and I'll comment on this, is that I did comment on the weighti-
ness of the action, and the plaintiff then files their notice 
to withdraw the action and dismiss the case as relevant in 
terms of whether a matter had been brought in bad faith and 
frivolous. Your motion is — for attorney's fees, for those 
reasons, respectfully denied. 
In some respects, that last comment, if you will, is 
the segway to the final motion, which is the objection — or 
the final matter, which is the objection to the notice of 
dismissal. 
Mr. Christensen. 
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MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, I think this motion is 
brought to define what ability the Court has primarily to enter 
its own orders. The argument has been made that because of the 
dismissal being entered, that the Court now doesn't even have 
the ability to sign the order that it asks us to prepare on 
the TRO and the injunction. 
I believe the practical effect of the dismissal 
really is not too meaningful beyond that, because I think 
the Court does have collateral jurisdiction to decide the 
other issues that are before the Court in terms of the order 
to seal, the order of contempt — an order of contempt, the 
order of attorney's fees; but this -- the Court did ask us to 
prepare an order. 
We did prepare an order on the preliminary injunction 
matter. We do believe that the Court still has the matter 
pending before it, regardless of the attempt to try to dismiss 
it under Rule 41(a), because there are matters that the Court 
has taken action on, and that there is no provision under the 
law that would deprive this Court of jurisdiction. 
Essentially the argument is that this Court does not 
have jurisdiction because the matter is dismissed, but under 
Rule 41(a), they can't just voluntarily dismiss this action 
when there's been a response filed to the complaint. 
One of the causes of action in the complaint was a 
request for preliminary injunction. We certainly filed a 
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written response to that. I think that we also mentioned the 
second cause of action, although it wasn't specifically framed 
as an answer, it certainly was a response. 
So under Utah law, although they use Federal law and 
the Federal rules to bolster their argument in this regard, 
it's really a different rule. Rule 41(a) is different in 
the State rules than it is in the Federal rules because the 
Federal rules specifically say that you have to file an answer, 
or a motion for summary judgment, or a 12(b)(6). The State 
rules don't say that. They just say that you have to file a 
response. 
So because the State rules are not quite as strict, 
and because a response was filed — 
THE COURT: The response being? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: The response being that we filed a 
written response to their petition for preliminary injunction. 
THE COURT: Right, but there was no — was there — in 
terms of the complaint that was filed, they filed a motion for 
preliminary injunction. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Correct. 
THE COURT: You responded to that. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: We did respond to that. 
THE COURT: Well, do you still object to the matter 
being dismissed? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: We don't bel — we don't object to 
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1 the matter being dismissed, with the understanding that this 
2 Court still has jurisdiction to sign its order regarding the 
3 preliminary injunction. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Olson, do you disagree? I'm not quite 
5 sure what the question of procedure — 
6 MR. OLSON: Yeah. 
7 THE COURT: There was no objection to the matter being 
8 dismissed, but that I've ruled upon and the — 
9 MR. OLSON: Well — 
10 THE COURT: -- preliminary injunction and so forth — 
11 MR. OLSON: Here's what I think the analysis is, your 
12 Honor, and I — we've dealt with some of the attachments to 
13 this motion already. So in a sense we're now down to something 
14 less than the full bucket of concerns. 
15 The rule reads that we could dismiss anytime prior 
16 to an answer or other response to the complaint. Now, that's 
17 crucial to say that it's to the complaint, because as Counsel 
18 just noted, what they filed was a response— a written response 
19 to a motion for preliminary injunction. So I note that at the 
20 outset. 
21 What we have conceded is that the Court could deal 
22 with the motion to strike/motion to seal or unseal. We had a 
23 hearing already — 
24 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Olson, I don't mean to interrupt 
25 you, but what are we — I'm afraid that it eludes me here. 
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Mr. Christensen seems to be concerned that by dismissing this 
case that somehow the injunctive relief that I denied you, or 
any other order somehow it will have no effect or --
MR. OLSON: Yeah, and I don't — I think — I think 
Mr. Christensen misconceives what Rule 65(a) says. When the 
Court entered the TRO, it had a time limit on it. The earlier 
of two dates. It's either ten days or when the Court had heard 
the preliminary injunction. When the matter was concluded on 
the preliminary injunction, the TRO went away, and time passed. 
This is all done. We did not obtain restraint. The 
world is as it was before the Court signed the TRO. That is 
resolved; and no amount of additional con — things going on 
in this Court are going to make that any different than it is. 
Mr. Christensen won. As I said, we accept that. 
What I understood Mr. Christensen wanted to do when he 
first objected to the notice to -- notice of dismissal was to 
deal with attorney's fees, which we have, and we concede that 
that was an open issue, to deal with the question of moving to 
either strike or to seal or whatever. That was dealt with on 
— at a prior hearing, and then the order to show cause, which 
we've dealt with today. 
As I understand it, there is no business left for 
this Court, and if the Court were to deal any further with the 
merits, it would be bumping up against Rule 41(a) which says 
this case is a nullity because of the filing of the notice of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-30-
dismissal. Something has to end, and the ending is on the 
merits. 
Now, that doesn't nullify anything that happened on 
April 26th, because that was simply to see if we could meet 
our burden to extend the restraint the Court had ordered. The 
Court concluded no, and the restraint ended of its own weight. 
There was — although the Court had asked for findings and 
conclusions, the fact was there was no occasion or need 
procedurally to do that, although the Court had asked. 
THE COURT: Let me — I ask him. Mr. Christensen, your 
concern is that this dismissal weight does not deal with the 
complaint on the merits? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: No, I'm — 
THE COURT: Is that what — I guess what eludes me here 
is exactly what the concern here is. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: The concern is this. The practical 
concern is this. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That if the Court is not permitted — 
and whether the Court does it under its collateral jurisdiction 
or does it under not allowing voluntary dismissal, but actually 
dismisses the case on its merits, we are concerned on two 
levels. One, that they could turn around and re-file this 
lawsuit, and re-file their request for a preliminary injunction 
and get a new judge, and we have to go through this whole thing 
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1 again because the Court has somehow been precluded from 
2 entering an order on the merits that the Court has already 
3 determined. 
4 THE COURT: Well, so that is exactly what your — you 
5 would like to — you would like a dismissal with prejudice? 
6 MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's right. 
7 THE COURT: I see. Is that — you understood that? 
8 MR. OLSON: Yes, and I would offer the Court — 
9 THE COURT: So it's a question of a dismissal with 
10 prejudice? 
11 MR. OLSON: We noticed dismissal, because we wanted to 
12 do it the simplest way, rather than call Counsel; but there is 
13 — if Counsel can sleep well tonight because Utah Legislature 
14 anticipated this problem, and he may not have been aware of 
15 the statute, Utah Code Annotated 78(a)-2-226 (1) says, "If an 
16 application for an order made to a Judge of a Court in which 
17 the action or proceeding is pending is refused in whole or in 
18 part, or is granted conditionally, a subsequent action for the 
19 same order may not be made to any other Judge except of a 
20 higher Court." 
21 By noticing dismissal we are not taking an appeal 
22 to a higher Court; and under this statute we could not do what 
23 Mr. Christensen is concerned we might do, which is go elsewhere 
24 to do this — 
25 THE COURT: Well, I don't think his concern is with the 
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1 complaint, not with the injunctive relief. 
2 MR. OLSON: The complaint— the complaint is dismissed, 
3 your Honor, and we have under — under the rules of the Court 
4 we are entitled to bring any counterclaims if we should choose, 
5 and I don't think we've done that in the Federal case, but that 
6 we are before the Court in the Federal case, and that's one 
7 reason we thought to dismiss this here, is — 
8 THE COURT: Let me ask this. Is it — is your dismissal 
9 with prejudice? That is, the dismissal of the complaint with 
10 prejudice — 
11 MR. OLSON: No, the Rule 40 — 
12 THE COURT: — or without prejudice? 
13 MR. OLSON: — the Rule 41(a) is without prejudice; 
14 and that was calculated for a limited basis because we are in 
15 Federal Court, and we don't want to have anything we do here 
16 tie our hands in defense of the action brought against us in 
17 Federal Court. That's all there is to that. There's nothing 
18 sneaky here. 
19 I'm just speaking to the only possible red herring or 
20 concern that Mr. Christensen could have, which would be that we 
21 might seek to do what we tried to do here by motion in another 
22 setting, and we — and so far as the Courts of the State of 
23 Utah are concerned, we can't do that. 
24 With respect to the Federal Court, we are bound only 
25 by the — we're bound to deal with it as a counterclaim, and I 
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1 can tell the Court we haven't brought any counterclaim. So 
2 we will be precluded to that action from bringing any further 
3 claims or counterclaims that might derive from the same facts 
4 as this. 
5 So as a practical matter, we are collaterally estopped 
6 from doing anything that might concern Mr. Christensen. The 
7 procedural context of this is that whichever way you turn, we 
8 have given up the options that Mr. Christensen is concerned we 
9 might exercise; and frankly — 
10 THE COURT: Well, in other ways. 
11 MR. OLSON: In other ways, yeah. Just the analysis 
12 is this can't happen in the manner which concerns him, and I 
13 believe it's why the 41(a) was a good answer, if we'd just not 
14 gotten into all these fights over this, and we would be done. 
15 I would submit to the Court that this motion should be 
16 denied. We should conclude this, and I think the only pending 
17 issue at that point is the form of the order on the motion to 
18 strike, which Mr. Christensen has submitted some findings on 
19 that that I don't believe the Court made; and has attempted 
20 to broaden the bases for striking the two paragraphs from the I 
21 letter. 
22 Aside from that, there's no further business in this 
23 matter before this Court, but I think the 41(a) takes care 
24 of it, and as I've explained to the Court, whether we turn to 
25 State or to Federal, our options have basically been limited to 
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1 I zero. We accept that, because we recognize that what happened 
2 in this Court on April 26th was definitive. 
3 J We'll accept that and we'll deal with the merits 
of the counterclaims against us through other defenses and 
through other affirmative claims, but not on the basis that 
we're entitled to seek some restraint from this — from this 
party. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
9 1 MR. OLSON: Thank you. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Christensen, I think I've now focused 
11 in exactly where we are. That is it's going to the procedure, 
12 I suppose; and that is if given the procedural posture of this 
13 case a — the plaintiff seeks a dismissal, seeks to voluntarily 
14 dismiss the case, is it with prejudice or without prejudice? 
15 The alternative, I suppose, that's begged by the 
16 objection, and that is I don't know that I can force him to 
17 prosecute the matter, I mean, in terms of what we would do 
18 there; but it seems to be a matter of procedure. I mean, 
19 are they precluded from, given the procedural posture of the 
20 matter, a notice for voluntary dismissal? 
21 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I think the clean answer to that, 
22 your Honor, is just to convert their voluntary dismissal into 
23 a motion to dismiss and have the Court dismiss the matter on 
24 its merits at such time — 
25 THE COURT: Well, that's what they don't want. 
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MR. CHRISTENSEN: I know they don't want it, but I 
don't — 
THE COURT: The question is can they do it. Is the 
matter dismissed without prejudice on their — given procedural 
posture of the matter with their — with their notice of volun-
tary dismissal? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, I think that the statute is 
not clear enough to give them the option of doing what they've 
done. A respon — the word "response" is a very broad and 
general term. I mean, the whole action arises out of the 
complaint, and we believe that any response is a response to 
the complaint, or else there wouldn't be a response. So we 
say they can't do it voluntarily, but I think we've stipulated 
that the matter can be dismissed with prejudice. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Well, that's the — let me take 
the matter -- I'll take the objection to the volun -- to the 
voluntary dismissal under advisement. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: All right. 
THE COURT: And let you know on that one. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Great. 
THE COURT: In terms of the — and Mr. Olson, you've 
indicated here there was a — which I thought I had a motion 
to strike. 
MR. OLSON: Yeah, there was a proposed order that was 
proposed by Counsel. When we received it we saw that there 
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1 were a number of findings that he had placed in the proposed 
2 order that were well beyond anything that we discussed in 
3 Court. So we offered an alternative order which was simply 
4 that the matter in the two paragraphs was immaterial, which I 
5 believe is the quote from the Judge — from your Honor at the 
6 time of the ruling on the matter, and we had hoped that that 
7 would suffice to make the record sufficient to strike those two 
8 portions that the Court agreed to strike, and do it as simply 
9 as possible, without saying more. So that's before the Court. 
10 I don't think we've submitted that for decision. If the Court 
11 would like, we could file a notice to submit the decision. 
12 THE COURT: Is that still pending? 
13 MR. CHRISTENSEN: It is. 
14 MR. OLSON: It is. 
15 THE COURT: Has it been briefed? 
16 MR. OLSON: They — we filed an objection. They filed 
17 a reply to our objection. 
18 THE COURT: Oh, I see. 
19 MR. OLSON: So — and then they — 
20 THE COURT: But it was done by way of an objection? 
21 MR. OLSON: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 MR. OLSON: They've also filed findings and conclusions 
24 with respect to the motion for preliminary injunction, which we 
25 contend that the 41(a) dismissal, basically the Court isn't in 
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don't 
a 
record where we might be called upon my client to do so. 
THE COURT: Well, so I— well, maybe the way we proceed 
in the most efficient manner so that I don't gum up the works, 
when it's appropriate, a notice to submit, outline of course 
the specific matter that's in front of me, so that I can get 
that in front of me and either call for further argument or 
decide it on the --
MR. OLSON: Our intention on the — 
THE COURT: — on the notice to submit. 
MR. OLSON: -- on the preliminary injunc — proposed 
preliminary injunction findings is until the Court has ruled on 
41(a) we would not address the merits of that proposal, but on 
the other — we'll put this in a notice to submit, your Honor, 
so the Court knows what's going on. 
THE COURT: So what I'm indicating is I'm not going to 
deal with anything else. 
MR. OLSON: Okay. 
THE COURT: I've taken under advisement the objection 
to the voluntary dismissal. 
MR. OLSON: Okay. 
THE COURT: I'll let you know in writing. Appreciate 
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all your efforts. 
MR. OLSON: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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